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Abstract 
In this study, transmission of information among direct real estate market, capital 
market and macro economic sectors are studied in 4 major cities in China over the 
period 1994Q1 – 2009Q1. 
 
Previous findings on correlations between direct and indirect real estate markets are 
discussed, followed by a brief introduction of the history of China’s real estate 
markets. Based on previous research on other markets and the specific economic and 
political situation of China, a set of hypotheses are developed. 
 
Results of empirical analysis show that price information flows from the indirect real 
estate market (listed property companies) to the office sub-sector. We also found that 
office returns contain information on future GDP growth but does not contain 
information on future inflation as measured by the China’s Consumer Price Index. On 
geographical information flows, we found that amongst all four most developed real 
estate markets, price information is first discovered in Shenzhen, which is than 
transmitted to other cities (Shanghai and Guangzhou) with the Beijing real estate 
market at the end of the information transmission chain.  Although Shenzhen has 
historically been a forerunner in economic reform, its leading status has been thought 
to be over taken by other major cities in China after 30 years of economic 
development. This study, however, shows that the Shenzhen real estate market is still 
the leading real estate markets in China in terms of price discovery. 
IV 
 
This study contributes to our understanding of the how real estate price influencing 
information is transmitted across the capital markets, the economy and geographically 
across cities in a fast developing economy. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
As in most countries, there are two main streams of property investment in China: the 
un-securitized tangible assets often referred to as private or direct real estate market 
and securitized property investment often referred to as public or indirect real estate 
market. The direct market is unlike securitized investment in that heterogeneous 
assets are traded infrequently in limited regional markets and transaction information 
is often confidential. (Geltner et al, 2003) This complies with the direct market in 
China especially Tier 2 cities where transaction data is costly and incomplete. 
 
Generally speaking, direct investment is surrounded by the troubles of illiquidity, 
large unit values, high management inputs and the for appraisal estimates of the 
selling price. (Chau et al, 2001) Especially for residential properties, one of the 
dominant purposes of purchasing housing real estate is for self-occupation instead of 
investment concern. Although certain proportion of the population would choose to or 
have to rent a property for occupation, the behavior of buying a property for long-
term occupation is a barrier to transaction liquidity. In many cases, habitants are 
unwilling to move since they are used to the current living condition or may have 
developed a solid relationship with the neighbors. As a result, the market price of 
those housing property cannot be realized since there are no transactions. In that case, 
appraisal is needed to realize the market value of the properties. However, direct 
investments suffer from appraisal smoothing. (Blundell and Ward, 1987, Geltner, 
1991, MacGregor and Nanthakumaran, 1992) 
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In terms of indirect market, it is normally divided into two forms, the shared property 
companies listed on stock exchange and the real estate investment funds and trust. In 
case of China, there is currently no REITs launched and real estate funds are mostly 
private and confidential instead of listed and public traded, thus shared property 
companies are the major source of indirect property investment. Often, such 
companies are highly levered. (Chau et al, 2001) 
 
Besides the facts that these two investment forms are not perfect substitutes, it is 
found out that there is some certain correlation between direct and indirect markets 
and securitized real estate offers information that helps forecast direct property 
indices. (Gyourko and Keim, 1992) Accordingly, price discovery is ‘a process of 
information aggregation, through which market participants’ options about the value 
of an asset are combined together into a single statistics, the market price of the 
asset’ (Barkham and Geltner, 1995, P. 21) 
 
Past study on price discovery within China property market is generally rare due to 
following reasons: 
 
1. The data provided by the government (HPI) is hard to approach and inaccurate in 
nature, causing trouble for systematic research. The inaccuracy is mainly due to 
the purpose of the government to keep a rational image of the property sector and 
to conduct market control. And the private sector such as DTZ and Jones Lang 
Lassalle which are expected to provide more accurate data didn’t provide any 
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indices service until around 1988 - 1993. A brief introduction of several major 
indices will be carried out in Section 1 of the article. Thus, lack of dependable 
data blocks research on this field 
 
2. The property market is not mature enough to be studied until recently and there 
are a lot of uncertainties decreasing the value of any potential study. This is 
mainly because of the special features of the Chinese economy structure and 
several reforms in the near history. A brief history of the real estate market in 
China will be introduced in Section 1 of the article. 
 
3. There is no stock market in China until end of 1990, and this makes long-term 
study (20 years or longer) impossible. A very brief history of the stock market in 
China will be introduced in Section 1 of the article. 
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Chapter Two Objectives 
This paper mainly aims to investigate the transmission of information among real 
estate market, capital market and macro economics sector in 4 major capital cities in 
China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao). The study of real estate market includes 
only residential and office sectors, due to data constraints.  
 
This paper includes a number of hypotheses that developed based on existing theories 
and an analysis of the constraints special condition in China’s real estate markets.  
The analysis will be based on the political and economic situations in China including 
market reform and policy announcement. The objective is to predict the pattern of 
flow of price information between markets. In particular, we would like to explain 
information flow between: 
 
1. Indirect and direct real estate markets 
2. Real estate market and the economy 
3. Sub-sector of real estate markets (residential and office) 
4. The four most developed real estate market in Mainland China, i.e. Shenzhen, 
Guangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing. 
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Chapter Three Literature Review 
So far, price discovery in property market is not as popular as price formation in the 
private real estate market. (Geltner et al, 2003) There are plenty of appraisal related 
papers but fewer dealing with correlation between two markets. Gyourko and Keim 
studied price discovery in US market in 1992 (Gyourko and Keim, 1992), Geltner et 
al studied price discovery in US and UK commercial property market (Barkham and 
Geltner, 1995, 1996), Chau et al studied price discovery in Hong Kong property 
market (Newell and Chau 1996, Chau et al, 2001), and there are also many studies 
covered price discovery and correlation in Singapore (Lau and Damon, 1990, Chan 
and Sng, 1991, Ong 1994, Ong and Sing 2002). Recently, price discovery in Malaysia 
is studied. (Mohd Lizam Mohd Diah, 2008) Nevertheless, their researches produce 
mixed results. In Newell and Chau (1996), strong evidence is found out that changes 
in property companies price lead changes in office and residential by one quarter in 
Hong Kong market. In Barkham and Geltner (1995), evidence is also found to support 
the existence of price discovery occurred in the indirect property market. Price 
information does not fully transmit into indirect property market by a year or more in 
US whereas in UK market direct property market is more closely and immediately 
linked to the indirect property market. In Myer and Webb (1993), they found that 
inter-temporally indirect market Granger cause the direct market indices returns in US 
market. In Chau et al (2001) the results show that the returns to indirect real estate in 
Hong Kong convey little or no information about the appraisal-based return to Hong 
Kong real estate. This variety of results is consistent with Geltner et al 
(2003):‘Exactly how far and how long the valuations may differ are matters of debate 
and currently on the cutting edge of research.’ Thus, the answer will differ due to 
difference of time, location and condition. 
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Nevertheless, there are overlapping or generally accepted features: serial correlation 
in the private market not in the public market; low contemporaneous correlation 
between the two markets; high lagged cross-correlation; Granger causality between 
the two markets, with public market leading the private market in time. (Geltner et al, 
2003) According to Chau (2001), the type of correlations including cross-correlation, 
autocorrelations and regressions, desmoothing and unlevering, the time serious 
characteristics of the serious, substitutability, and price discovery. Meanwhile, most 
studies are planned for short-term effects. 
 
There are plenty of papers discussing relationship between stock market and real 
estate market, direct and indirect. Hartzell and Mengden (1986, 1987) use Equity 
REITs as a sample and find out that direct real estate market is weakly correlated with 
the stock market. On the other hand, Titman and Warga (1986) use REITs as well as 
another sample and apply multi-factor approach but found out that there is high 
correlation between direct market and stock market. In terms of correlation between 
direct and indirect property market, Chau et al (2001) find out in his intensive 
literature review that former research suggests a low contemporaneous correlation 
between returns of direct property and securitized properties. Nevertheless, he 
suggests that there is strong evidence of autocorrelation within the private real estate 
market returns and of lagged cross-correlation with public real estate returns. He 
explained the former phenomenon by appraisal smoothing and the latter by price 
discovery. Also there are some papers with focus on China market, although 
constrained by the limited data. According to Zhao (2007), the stock market is the 
Granger-cause of the property market before 2002 and this situation turned to the 
opposite after 2002, thus the year of 2002 is defined as the breakpoint within the 
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sample data ranging from 1998 to 2005. Zhao tried to explain the granger effect 
before 2002 through the credit market, and his approach is based on Nan-Kuang Chen 
(2001). In Chen’s paper, he tried to explain the correlation within Taiwan’s market 
via the credit market in Taiwan, and Zhao applied the same approach to China market. 
Zhao also tried to explain the granger effect after 2002 via the asset allocation of 
capital market, since the stock market is performing under expectation after 2002 and 
real estate market indicated a higher return during that period. 
 
Autocorrelation within direct market in US market is found out and explained by 
Myer and Webb (1992) using eight NCREIF direct property sub-indices in which all 
but one show first order serial correlation. The same test on 5 REITs showed only one 
set of serial correlation and is negative. In the UK direct market, autocorrelation is 
found out by Barkham and Geltner (1994) and Macgregor and Nanthakumaran (1992). 
In terms of Hong Kong direct market, strong first-order autocorrelation is also 
discovered in JLW appraisal based indices. This strong autocorrelation indicated 
appraisal smoothing in the indirect indices and that require desmoothing to be taken. 
This process is taken by Geltner 1991, Macgregor and Nanthakumaran (1992), 
Barkham and Geltner (1994) and Chau et al (2001). Originally, smoothing is 
suggested in Blundell and Ward (1987) as a method to update an appraisal, referred to 
as the transfer function (Blundell and Ward, 1987): 
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Where at is the estimate of value in current time, at-1 is last period’s appraisal, yt is the 
fundamental price (true market value) and K is a constant between 0 and 1. In Chau 
(2001), a formula for desmoothing is mentioned: 
 
 
 
Where r
u
t is the unobservable underlying market return series at time t; r*t is the 
observed appraisal-based index return in year t; and a is the smoothing parameter. 
Thus, the true series can be extracted from the coefficient of first-order serial 
correlation. Also provided by Geltner (1993), assumption of an efficient market is 
unnecessary.  
 
Since returns of both direct and indirect market return are linked to macroeconomics 
and corporate finance factors, linkage is discussed using CAPM as single-factor 
model while APT (Titman and Warga, 1986), Fama-French 3-factor model (Chiang et 
al, 2004) and 5-factor model as multi-factor model. Many related research has been 
carried out using REIT as a sample. Chan et al (1991) employ a multifactor Arbitrage 
Pricing Model using pre-specified macroeconomic factor. They found that unexpected 
inflation and changes in the risk and term structures of interest rates are 3 main factors 
driving REIT performance. Chau et al (2001) use 3 categories of variables namely, 
capital market variables, local securitized property variables and local economic and 
property market variables. 
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In terms of cross-correlation and price discovery, Granger causality test is often 
applied. Myer and Webb (1994) found that EREIT returns lead the NEREIF direct 
property indices returns, and Gyourko and Keim (1992) found that lagged EREIT 
excess return can predict NCREIF after adjustment. As mentioned at the beginning, 
real estate companies are usually highly levered. Thus, unlevering helps a robust 
result. Methods are developed by Saunders and Ward (1978) and Fisher et al (1994). 
A combination of desmoothing and unlevering is applied in Barkham and Geltner 
(1995) and Chua et al (2001). Study by John Okunev, Patrick Wilson, Ralf Zurbruegg 
in 2001 examines the dynamic relationship that exists between the US real estate and 
S&P 500 stock markets, and conducted both linear and nonlinear causality tests 
between the years of 1972 to 1998. Linear test results generally show a uni-directional 
relationship to exist from the real estate market to the stock market. However, these 
results are not consistent with financial theory and for all sub-samples of the data. In 
contrast, the nonlinear causality test shows a strong unidirectional relationship 
running from the stock market to the real estate market, and is consistent in the 
presence of any structural breaks. 
 
Although close to China, the Hong Kong market is much more efficient and 
transparent. With longer history of real estate market and stock market development, 
related data is available and research on this field is adequate. Thus, study on Hong 
Kong could be inspiring for similar study in China. Chui and Chau 2005 examines the 
lead-lag relationships between real estate prices, real estate investments, and 
economic growth. The results suggest that there is no relationship between GDP and 
real estate investment. This contradicts the results of similar previous studies in other 
economies. However, the lack of a relationship between real estate investment and 
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economic growth does not mean that changes in demand for real estate have no effect 
on economic performance. Since Hong Kong's real estate market is very efficient, 
changes in demand conditions in the real estate sector are reflected more accurately 
and quickly in real estate prices. Their empirical results through Granger causality 
Test show that real estate prices, especially office and residential prices, lead 
economic growth. (Chui & Chau, 2005) That is the case in Hong Kong with high 
market efficiency, the situation in China could be different according to different 
cities. However, the research method here is inspiring.  
 
Based on the few papers discussing existence of correlation or Granger causality 
between China real estate market and stock market, Zhao 2007 provided a reasonable 
explanation. According to Zhao’s research based on Real Estate Sales Monthly Index 
Shanghai Stock Index Monthly Data from March 1998 to November 2005, he found 
that a solid trigger system could be the credit market. According to Yi 2005 and Pang 
2005 on credit ratio on real estate development, although source of finance for real 
estate development is various, the most essential source is development loans and 
housing mortgage loans from commercial banks. 
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According to the above chart, proportion of self-raised funds keep a constant rate of 
26%, except for 2004 during macro control. On the other hand, the proportion of 
statutory budget and bonds financing decreased every year and the proportion of 
foreign investment decreased more rapidly. The deduction of public finance indicates 
the fading away of government involvement, and the deduction of foreign investment 
deserves further study, although it may because of policy control or capital barrier. 
Indeed, among the total real estate investment in China, the percentage of foreign 
investment can reveal the interest shown by global investors on this emerging market. 
However, the statistics provided by National Bureau of Statistics of China cannot 
prove any increase of this proportion. In consistent with Yi’s findings, a decline in 
this proportion was found especially since 1997. 
 
Year 
Domestic 
Loan 
Foreign 
Investment Self-finance Total 
% of foreign 
investment 
1985 187.92 73.52 339.99 601.43 12.22% 
1986 200.13 109.54 344.65 654.32 16.74% 
1987 255.46 139.01 382.78 777.25 17.88% 
1988 284.66 218.31 488.75 991.72 22.01% 
1989 293 221.45 495.03 1009.48 21.94% 
1990 378.62 224.05 529.92 1132.59 19.78% 
1991 527.07 239.96 746.73 1513.76 15.85% 
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1992 831.48 334.15 1242.92 2408.55 13.87% 
1993 1117.55 456.15 1991.25 3564.95 12.80% 
1994 1583.45 912.03 2820.48 5315.96 17.16% 
1995 3511.86 2114.05 7940.79 13566.7 15.58% 
1996 -5247.03 -3018.41 -14600.3 -22865.7 13.20% 
  3903.19 2475.6 7748.18 14126.97 17.52% 
1997 4136.68 2424.49 8722.33 15283.5 15.86% 
1998 4918.03 2377.89 9885.48 17181.4 13.84% 
1999 5249.8 1832.21 10042.86 17124.87 10.70% 
2000 6245.82 1526.15 11227.52 18999.49 8.03% 
2001 6672.49 1570.5 13708.53 21951.52 7.15% 
2002 8167.51 1825.83 16567.7 26561.04 6.87% 
2003 11223.89 2211.7 23617.35 37052.94 5.97% 
2004 12842.9 2706.59 32196.07 47745.56 5.67% 
2005 15363.86 3386.411 44154.51 62904.79 5.38% 
2006 18814.82 3811.048 56547.51 79173.38 4.81% 
2007 22136.08 4549.018 74520.88 101206 4.49% 
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It is not the purpose of this paper to investigate the decline of foreign investment and 
its effect on market, although it could a valuable topic for China real estate market 
development study in the future. The objective to discuss on this trend is to prove that 
commercial bank loans were the major source of finance and foreign investment 
cannot substitute as essential source of finance. 
 
Except for self-raised finance, the biggest percentage source of finance is bank loans 
and other means of finance. According to Pang 2005, other means of finance mainly 
consist of pre-sales revenue. In the study of 2004 source of finance for real estate 
finance, only 16% of the self-raised fund is owned by developers. Thus, actually more 
than 80% of the finance is from bank loans. Besides according to Balance Sheets of 
China real estate companies, average Debt-to-Asset ratio has been as high as 75% 
since 1997, which is much higher than the 60% national average. Since commercial 
banks are the major source of finance for real estate development in China and the 4 
biggest commercial banks are state-owned and subject to macro control, the credit 
market for real estate industry is subject to government control. According to Zhao 
2007, when the government loosens credit control, the property price would rise due 
to credit support. Meanwhile listed real estate developers increased its Net Asset 
Value due to asset price increase, and therefore increased its equity price since 
valuation for real estate equities is based on NAV approach. His explanation on the 
linkage of two markets may result into arbitrage opportunity and also forecast and 
prevents financial system collapse or financial market crisis. That is why this research 
is valuable for both academic purpose and social stability.  
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Although price discovery is no longer a new topic in modern real estate study, 
research in China market is still limited. Research in China is important, since with 
the fast-paced development of Chinese economy mainly since the ‘Economic 
Reform
1’ since 1978, domestic and foreign investment on Chinese property market 
has risen to a certain height and became a crucial part of global investment portfolio. 
According to Cushman & Wakefield 2010, Chinese real estate market exceeded US 
market in terms of volume in the year of 2009, and became the number one real estate 
investment market in the world. The report shows that in 2009, the total amount of 
global real estate investment was USD 365 billion, while China real estate investment 
was USD 156.2 billion, which doubled the amount last year and reached 40% of the 
world’s total. The report also predicts the consistency of this trend in 2010. 
                                                             
1 The Chinese economic reform refers to the program of economic reforms featured by "Socialism with 
Chinese characteristics" in the People's Republic of China. It started in December 1978 by pragmatists 
within the Communist Party of China (CPC), with Deng Xiaoping as leader, and the reform goes on 
since then. According to government documents, the goal of Chinese economic reform was to generate 
sufficient surplus value to finance the modernization of the mainland Chinese economy. 
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Chapter Four Development of China Real Estate Market 
Since 1978 the beginning of ‘the Economic Reform of China’, development of real 
estate market in China can be divided into 5 phases. 
 
The first phase is from the end of 1978 to the end of 1991, during which period the 
real estate was gradually formed into a separate industry instead of form of 
government policy. In 1982 after the announcement of ‘Reform of use of state-owned 
land’, Shenzhen became the first city in China where land use fee was charged from 
land users according to different usage. Before that, there was no land use fee charged 
from land users. Also in 1980, the proportion of State Budgetary Appropriations 
started to decline and private enterprises and individual investment started to get 
involved in the real estate industry. Among the sources of finance, individual 
investment was increasing by almost 50% annually. For the first time in decades, non-
state participants started to play crucial roles in the real estate industry. The idea of 
‘Urban Housing Reform’ was raised during the 1980’s and was implemented in a 
large scale since 1988. The emphasis of the reform is to transform housing system 
from part of the welfare system to open market segments, and redefine the housing 
properties as commercial properties traded in the market instead of state-owned estate 
only subject to national policy. Private parties started to own properties as market 
products, and this market started to be at least influenced by the market economy. 
 
Since 1992, the development of China real estate market moved into a new age. This 
stage can be further divided into 4 phases: 
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I. 1992 to June 1993: a great upsurge in real estate 
In the year of 1992, major cities in China started mass construction, and the number 
of registered real estate companies (‘developers’) increased from 3000 in January to 
12400 at the end of December. Amount of investment on real estate on that year 
reached RMB 73.2 billion, which is 117% higher than the last year. Among this 
amount, the use of foreign investment capital reached USD 710 million, which is 
228% higher than last year. The participation of foreign investment also pushed this 
upsurge into a new height. By the first half of 1993, the number of real estate 
companies reached 20000, and around 50% of the developers concentrate on the 
southern China, mainly 5 provinces and cities, namely, Guangdong, Hainan, Fujian, 
Shanghai and Jiangsu. 
 
However, the overflow of liquidity in a short period resulted into some systematic and 
market problems. 
 
1. With different institutions and local government having the right of approval 
on land use, the competition among suppliers caused land value dissipation 
during transactions 
 
2. The demand for financing increased dramatically in a short period, causing 
inflation and related social problems 
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3. In order to make full use of the land, luxury residential buildings was 
overdeveloped while medium quality residential buildings was rare in market, 
causing housing problem 
 
4. Without the timely supplement of regulations, the market flaws started to 
expand and increase in scale 
 
II. June 1993 to1995: macro regulation and control 
Due to the overheated market and according problems, the central government issued 
‘No. 6 Document’ on June 24th, 1993. According to the Document, there would be a 
thorough inspection on the real estate industry based on following items: 
 
1. For companies with inadequate capital or incomplete registration information, 
corporate license should be revoked 
 
2. Banks and land administration institutions should not operate real estate 
companies of any kind, and the current ones should be separated within 
specific date 
 
 
 
3. For those land buyers who cannot raise up to 25% of the land acquisition 
payment within one year after transaction, that piece of land should be 
regained 
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4. Title of the land cannot be transformed if development process didn’t reach 
20% of the investment input (excluding land acquisition payment) 
 
After the implementation of ‘Document 6’, investment on real estate slowed down its 
process of expanding. Nevertheless, amount of investment still increases by 164.9% 
in 1993 and 41.7% in 1994. In the year of 1995, certain percentage of the investment 
capital started to transform from southern China and east coast to the central and 
western part of China, partly because of the regulations and decreasing rate of return 
on major cities. 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Development investment 337 731.2 1937 2737 3498 
Annual Increase (%) 117 164.9 41.3 27.8 / 
Data Source from: 'Beijing Real Estate', 1995-1996 Journal 
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III. 1996 to 1998: High vacancy rate and depressed market 
After the 1995 burst of bubble, there are two problems existed in the market. First is 
to digest the vacant commercial properties in the market built since 1992; second is to 
stimulate demand in the market, which also simultaneously solves the excess supply 
problem. 
 
According to Journal of China Real Estate 2000, vacant area in commercial 
residential properties was increasing during 1996 to 1998, mainly because some of the 
projects started before 1995 housing bubble burst were finished in the following 3 
years, continuously expand the market supply.  
 
National Vacant Area in commercial residential properties 
Year 1996 1997 1998 
Vacant Area(million sq.m) 46.62 52.02 61.46 
 
In order to solve the real estate depression, government brought out macro control and 
market adjustment to stimulate incentives: 
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1. Registered permanent residence incentive.  
 
This is similar to investment immigration in other countries in the world, except that 
the objective is to transfer permanent residency from one city to another. Due to 
education, health care or business purposes, some residences in China are willing to 
pay for permanent residency in Shanghai, Beijing or Shenzhen. At the end of 1995, 
Shenzhen announced the local policy that Chinese residence who bought properties in 
Bao An or Long Gang District can registered as Shenzhen permanent residence, and 
this policy stimulated real estate sales volume in Shenzhen into a certain height. Thus 
since the 1996, many cities mimic this policy, especially in August 1996 in Shanghai. 
The Shanghai government announced that any Chinese residence who bought 
residential properties in Pudong District would be entitled Residency in Shanghai. 
This policy was drafted as headline in newspapers, and was commented all over 
China. 
 
2. Decline the land price in order to decrease property price.  
 
This policy is highly questioned here. The land price is derived from expected 
property price via residual value method. If the government set lower land price while 
the property price demanded by developer is still high, then more profit is gained by 
developers and consumers cannot enjoy any benefit. If the government set lower land 
price while the property price demanded by developer is lower and affordable by 
consumers, then the developer will bid the land and brought new supply to the market, 
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which would not help the excess supply situation. Thus, the author here doubts the 
effect of this policy. However it happened in Guangzhou local policy was announced 
in August 1996 that land price would decrease by 25% while government utility fee 
would decrease by 20%. The press and media gave positive comments on this policy, 
although this should be questioned by ethical professionals. 
 
3. Withdraw any unreasonable state charge. 
 
The reasons for high property price is multi-factored, and except for high land price 
considered by government and inflating construction cost, unreasonable fee charged 
by government and state-owned institutions are also influential. According to press 
release by national bureau of statistics, 30% to 40% of property price is filled by fee 
and charges, and this percentage is as high as 60% to 70% in some of the cities in 
China. In order to construct a robust real estate market, the National Finance Bureau 
announced in December 1996 to remove 48 items charged during development. 
However according to later calculation, the 48 items in the document only filled 2.5% 
of property price, and the effect of this policy is also doubted. 
 
4. Market incentive by providing housing mortgage.  
 
According to ‘Urban property mortgage management measures’ issued in June 1997 
by Construction Bureau of China and ‘Individual housing mortgage management 
measures’ issued in May 1998 by People’s Bank of China, individuals without 
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adequate liquidity but with intention to purchase residential flat may be granted 
mortgage loans provided mainly be state-owned banks. Although this is a good 
measure to increase demand, more concern should be put on the nature of transactions, 
whether it is first purchase for self-occupation purpose or other purchases for 
investment purpose. 
 
5. Cease distribution of residential properties to employees.  
 
This is the essential objective of the residential real estate reform and it also a key 
measure in this time’s real estate crisis. Before this announcement, real estate is still a 
part of state-owned properties since state-enterprises and institutions can distribute 
properties to employees as bonus or incentives. In July 1998 the State Council 
announced ‘Notice on further reform of housing regulations in urban areas’, and 
stated clearly to cease distribution of residential properties to employees since second 
half of 1998, and implement the monetary procedure of residential property 
distribution. Since then local governments started to bring out implementation plans, 
and Jiangsu Province ceased distribution since December 1998. Cash and equivalents 
were assigned instead of real properties, and employees would have to buy properties 
through the market. This is a milestone in the real estate reform and a flag benchmark 
in the economic reform since 1978. 
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IV. 1999 to 2002: Robust Development 
After the big step forward in 1998 to cease the property distribution to employees, 
mass population in China started to realize the new model of real estate and also have 
the incentive to purchase properties in the market. This largely increases robust 
participation in the market since more self-occupiers involved in the market. In the 
year of 2001, the percentage of buyer-occupier is 97.5% in Shanghai, 96.8% in 
Tianjin, 93% in Changchun, and this number in most other cities has reached to 99%. 
This percentage increase is mainly due to the reform from real properties distribution 
to cash allowance, and also indicated the gradual withdraw of institutional speculators 
on the residential market. Although it all looks good, the government didn’t stop the 
process of improvement. An overall review was launched by the government on 
commercial banks real estate businesses, and the scope was from June 2001 to 
September 2002. The result was announced in ‘Monetary Policy Execution Report 
2002’, and punishment was brought on commercial banks providing loans to non-
certificated developers or those with inadequate financial capability. The 
measurement for credit issues was implemented in April 2003 via the ‘No. 121 
Document’, and certain regulation adjustments were brought on source of finance. 
The government attitude was transformed from supporting to be on alert. 
 
V. 2003 to now: Souring property price and central government control 
According the property price, the souring up of property price never really stopped 
since 2003. The policy control was designed from various perspectives of the product 
line, mainly finance and land supply. Among the macro control measurements raised 
by the central government, the ‘Eight national macro control’ in 2005 and the ‘Six 
national macro control’ in 2006 has essential position. 
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The Eight national macro controls was raised by Premier Wen Jia Bao at April 2005, 
one month after the ‘Notice on stabilization of residential property price’ was issued, 
and he stated that the major problems in real estate market is mainly: 
 
1. The scale of investment is too big 
2. The commercial residential properties price is increasing too fast 
3. The structural of commercial residential market is unreasonable 
4. Lack of market order 
 
Based on the existing problems, 8 specific measurements were announced: 
 
1. To improve the market structure. Local governments should complete 
arrangement plans and schedule on commercial and economic residential 
properties and announce to the public within 2004. This measurement is 
mainly aims to the social complaints on high supply of high-quality properties 
and lack of low-price properties. Developers and government would share the 
social responsibility of providing medium to low price commercial properties, 
and the government’s duty is to provide land supply of these kinds.  
 
2. To control land supply and improve land administration. This measurement 
mainly aims to increase supply of land subject to medium to low price 
commercial development and economic housing development. This is 
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consistent with the 1
st
 measurement, and was trying to control the market from 
the top of the supply chain. 
 
3. To reinforce the supply and control on medium to low price commercial 
development and economic housing development. This is consistent with the 
3
rd
 measurement and further strengthens the support towards buyer-occupiers 
and medium to low income families. 
 
4. To improve the urban low-rent housing system, and ensure the housing supply 
for lowest-income families. This is to solve the housing problem for the low-
income families, and also to cope with any relevant social problems. 
 
5. To apply taxation control on the real estate market, especially adjustment on 
property transactions. This measurement aims to constrain active speculation 
in the market by increasing the cost of transaction. Due to the direct impact by 
this measurement, it was expected to receive immediate effect. 
 
6. To apply financial monitoring, especially commercial banks on issuing loans. 
This is consistent with the ‘Number 121 Document’ issued in 2002. 
Commercial bank loan is the main source of finance for real estate developers 
in China. Monitoring and control on this section can build a robust finance 
market as well as real estate market, the two of which are highly correlated. 
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7. To apply market regulations and keep good market order. As according to 
Premier Wen, the market order in real estate market is not up to standard. With 
the potential problems in the market, lack of market order can expand current 
market flaws and result into market crisis. 
 
8. To improve market monitoring and transparency, including fewer constraints 
on press and media in order to achieve market transparency. This 
measurement together with 7
th
 measurement can increase the market order of 
real estate industry. This measurement itself also indicates that government is 
prepared to accept assistance and monitoring from the public. 
 
However, the effect of ‘Eight Measures’ was lower than expected. Although property 
price in Shanghai decreased during certain period, it resume to increase in 2006 while 
other cities including Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen record price increase even 
after the announcement. Based on current situation, the central government reviewed 
the current policy and issued ‘Six National Measures’ in 2006: 
 
1. Adjust residential property supply. Emphasis should be put on low and 
medium price properties with medium size, as well as economic properties and 
low-rent properties. Local governments are required to plan and implements 
specific requirements on current and future residential developments. 
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2. Further apply adjustment functions of taxation policy, credit loans control and 
land administration. Due to the nature of taxation in transactions, credit loans 
in source of finance and land administration in land supply, these 3 factors are 
crucial determinants in the real estate market. The problem of land reserve was 
further emphasized here. 
 
3. Control the pace of urban redevelopment and housing removal. The big scale 
of housing removal during the urban redevelopment procedure may generate 
demand for commercial residential properties in a short period, especially for 
low and medium price properties. Therefore, declining the pace of urban 
redevelopment could slow down the souring property price. 
 
4. Further rectifying market order. In this article, 4 specific actions were 
emphasized, namely, change of use without permission, illegal transactions, 
hoarding for speculation and driving up prices. 
 
5. Further develop urban low-rent housing development and economics housing 
market as well as secondary market and rental market in order to ensure 
housing condition of low-income families. 
 
6. Develop a complete real estate statistics and information release system, 
increase market transparency and accuracy of market information. 
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The ‘Six National Measurements’ is different from the former ‘Eight National 
Measurements’ from the following two perspectives: 
 
The first is different macroeconomics background. Before the central government 
issued ‘the Eight National Measurements’, the main problem in the real estate market 
was over-investment. 
 
After the announcement of measurement, the increase in real estate investment 
decline in speed, and went back to lower than 20% in December 2005. In the 1
st
 
quarter in 2006, the investment in fixed assets increased by 29%, while investment in 
real estate increased by 20%. According to these figures, the overheated problem is 
well solved. 
 
Secondly, in this round of macro control, the main purpose is not solving 
overinvestment. Instead, focus was placed on market structure. While the ‘Eight 
National Measurements’ focus on stable property price, the ‘Six National 
Measurements’ aims to make sure the affordability of general public especially low to 
medium income families. That is why market structure is emphasized here. In the six 
measures, detail number on this issue is given, e.g., for any development since June 
1
st
 2006, 70% of the whole development should consist of flats with less than 90 
sq.m2 construction area. 
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In the ‘Eight Measurements’, the policy was subject to China as whole. However, 
there are distinctive differences between major cities. Thus in the ‘Six National 
Measurements’, certain policies including percentage of small and medium size 
properties and supply of economic properties development are subject to local 
governments. 
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Chapter Five Development of Hypothesis 
Part I. Direct and Indirect Market 
The main purpose of the paper is to test causal relation between direct and indirect 
market of China. Most historical papers and related studies in other countries indicate 
price discovery from indirect market to the direct market. Thus in this paper, we 
assumed the same direction in China: Indirect market granger-cause changes in both 
office and residential market, while the real estate sector cannot granger-cause 
changes in the real estate stock market. Although some papers have shown a low 
correlation between stock market and direct real estate market (Hartzell et al, 1986), 
others showed a high correlation even non-real estate stocks are included and 
dominant in the index. (Titman and Warga, 1986) When only real estate stocks or 
REITS are included, the result is consistent after de-smoothing process. After wiping 
off the autocorrelation effect, high correlation is found between indirect and direct 
real estate market. (Hartzell and Mengden 1987) 
 
In China’s market, the stock market is more liquid than the real estate market, which 
is consistent with the global situation. While stock market is determined by factors 
including monetary market and policy control, direct real estate market is determined 
by more than these factors. Land supply, demand from domestic and foreign sectors, 
urbanization process and local government administration also influence the direct 
market performance to a large scale. Thus, the stock market should digest and reflect 
market information before the direct market, and direct market cannot gave feedback 
with a clear track. 
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Within the direct market, office and residential markets also differs due to different 
determinants. The demand and supply of office market is more related to the business 
cycle and commercial entities performance. Tenants of office buildings mainly consist 
of private business enterprises and corporate clients. The performance of these tenants 
will affect their affordability of office occupation and location, and directly influence 
the rental income of office building investors. Accordingly, rental income determines 
the value of the office properties through Discounted Cash Flow model (Cuninghame-
Green, 1965), and therefore, the performance of corporate clients influence office 
properties price with clear evidence. Meanwhile the performances of corporate clients, 
sometimes indicated by the corporate climate index or similar proxy benchmark, also 
influence the stock market directly, and further cause changes in the real estate stock 
market. Many studies have discovered that real estate stocks performance discovers 
price from the capital market more than factors from the direct property market. 
(Gyourko & Keim, 1992) When corporate climate became a dominant determinant in 
both direct and indirect market, information bundle can cause effect on both markets 
simultaneously and casual relation between these two markets can be more obvious 
and closely related. 
 
On the other hand for the residential sector, determinants vary a lot from the indirect 
capital market compared to the office market. Instead of corporate clients, the 
residential market participants mainly consist of households and private investors. 
Change in this market, therefore, is more related to income and salary. Although the 
capital market is also an indicator of economics trend and asset value changes, the 
unique feature of residential properties as dwelling place result to the different 
perspective of absorbing information through residential market and real estate stocks. 
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Thus, the residential market is predicted to discover price from indirect market not as 
strongly as that of the office market. 
 
Although direct market is predicted to discover price from the indirect market, it is 
also predicted to give feedback to the real estate stocks in the same time. In the past 
decade, stock market and real estate market are two dominant investment destinations 
in China. The two markets serve as alternatives, as well as correlated assets. Some 
information such as policy control and consumer preference may give implications 
and report back to the stock market after absorbed by the real estate market, during 
when feedback effect is expected. 
 
Previous study regarding flow of information among different sectors is limited, and 
the most recent one found is done by Y Fu, LK Ng in 2002. They used transaction-
based excess returns for residential and office properties in Hong Kong and that of 
Hang Seng Index as sample data, and found out speed of price adjustment in real 
estate and stock markets. After examining the volatility of excess return in stock 
market, residential market and office market as a proxy for speed of digesting news 
and information, they found that the stock market absorbs information quicker than 
real estate market, while the office market and residential market presents similar 
speed in digesting news. After further data processing including de-smoothing, office 
market excess return appears to be somehow more volatile than residential market, 
although the difference is not significant. 
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In general, when two or more markets are linked together, price discovery takes place 
on the more liquid market and price information is then transmitted to the less linked 
but less liquid market.  Therefore, since the indirect or securitizes real estate market 
(listed property companies) is more liquid than the direct real estate market, we 
propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Price Information flows from the indirect real estate market 
(listed property companies) to the office sub-sector  
 
Hypothesis 2:  Price Information flows from the indirect real estate market 
(listed property companies) to the residential sub-sector 
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Part II. Office and Residential Market 
When the price discovery process turned to the real estate market itself, hypothesis 
could be built upon flow of information among different sectors, including residential, 
office, commercial and industrial. 
 
In this study, we assumed residential market is more efficient than the office market. 
This assumption is mainly due to the higher liquidity in residential market compared 
to the others. The number of residential properties transactions exceeds the number of 
office properties transactions by a large scale. Once there is new market information, 
the property sector can absorb information once the new is released, and the price 
change by the piece of information is discovered in the property transactions happen 
in the next few days since residential transactions are done on a daily basis. Turning 
to the office sector, when the same piece of news is released, even if the office sector 
is also sensitive to this information and is willing to discover new price from the 
specific information, lack of transactions blocks the price discovery process. The new 
price cannot be discovered until new transaction happens in the market, which could 
take a certain period of time that is usually longer than residential market’s 
transaction frequency. Thus, the speed of reflecting market information differs from 
office market to the residential market. 
 
In a lot of cases appraisal-based index is applied as proxy for direct real estate market. 
Then in that case, difference in transaction frequency doesn’t play a crucial role in the 
price discovery sequence. But even if appraisal-based index is applied, the residential 
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market may still discover price earlier than office market. In the real estate 
development, the evaluation of residential market value is usually done through 
market comparable approach (Hendershott & Kane 1995) In this case, the value of 
residential is based on transaction price of similar units sold on the market and certain 
adjustments are applied, such as location, number of floors, area of unit, age of 
building, etc. Provided the active residential market, there are usually abundant 
qualified comparables in the market and valuation can be done based on more than 
one comparable, to achieve the most accurate market value. This is different in the 
office market. 
 
In the office market, although adjustments and modification is given during valuation, 
there still could be error since every property is unique and there is random error 
discovered in all types of property research. (Geltner, Graff & Young, 1994) (Graff & 
Young, 1999) This error is especially bigger in office market though since the number 
of transactions is very limited in the office market compared to residential, and may 
cause lack of qualified comparables and further increase error in valuation. Taking 
2009 Q4 as an example, there are only 6 complete transactions in Beijing office 
market (DTZ, 2010). Reasons for lack of comparable can be various. The residential 
market has a more mature second hand market, and systematic and market support for 
this market is complete. For example, the retail residential property agency and 
mortgage market is active through many countries. The second hand market in office 
sector is not that complete, since it is not common strategy for developers to sell the 
office building once it is built. Many investors prefer to hold the property and receive 
rental income. Leasing is considered as the major source of income in office sector. In 
this case, the market value of the property will have to be assessed by rental income, 
36 
 
and Discounted Cash Flow (Cuninghame-Green, 1965) method would be applied. But 
since the lease of contract usually last for 2-3 years or longer terms, the market rental 
cannot be assessed before contract renewal. In addition the growth rate of rental is 
assessed by estimation, and is possible to range away from the real situation. 
Therefore, market information cannot be fully digested in this method. Another 
reason is also because of the high amount of cash flow during office transactions. 
When the participants in the residential market are mainly households and retail 
investors, participants in the office sector is usually corporate clients or institutional 
investors, who are much smaller in the number of people. 
 
Based on the above analysis, we predicted that the residential and office markets in 
Mainland China are closely linked together and that most of price discovery process 
takes place in the residential market.  Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Price Information flows from the residential sub-sector to the 
office sub-sector 
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Part III. Direct Market and Inflation 
The absorption of market information including economics news and policy is 
assumed to be contemporaneous happens in real estate market and inflation index. 
The real estate market is considered to have inflation hedging characteristics. 
(Martin Hoesli et al, 1997) Indeed, the impact of inflation on the value of assets is 
considered one of the primary financial concerns of long-term investors. (Wurtzebach 
et al, 1991) Where real purchasing power is to be maintained or where liabilities are 
linked to the inflation rate, such as inflation linked pension entitlements, a suitable 
investment asset is required. In the 1980s’, Ibbotson and Fall, Ibbotson and Siegel, 
Brueggeman, et al., Fogler, hartzell, et al., and Rubens, et al., conclude that real estate 
compensates the investor for inflation risk. When real estate is added to a mixed-asset 
portfolio, the inflation risk of the expanded portfolio is substantially below that of the 
original portfolio (ex-real estate). Recent study in Hong Kong can also give 
implications on this issue, although with a different result. Ganesan and Chiang 1998 
examine whether real and financial assets in Hong Kong can hedge against inflation. 
In order to compare the inflation-hedging characteristics of both real and financial 
assets in Hong Kong during an eleven-year period (from 1984-94), the quarterly data 
was subjected to analysis using both the Fama and Schwert framework and co-
integration techniques. The study concludes that real assets in general are not a good 
hedge against inflation, in the sense the methodologies imply. Thus, although the 
inflation-hedging effect has been discovered in US and UK market, it is not the case 
in Hong Kong. Meanwhile Tien-Foo Sing and Swee-Hiang Yvonne Low 2000 have 
done similar research in Singapore. The results show that real estate provides a better 
hedge against inflation than does stock and securitized real estate.  
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As major form of real asset, real estate has long been considered as hedge against 
inflation. Some prefer real estate due to its better hedge against inflation compared to 
stock market. Hedge fund and mutual fund managers also prefer an asset with 
complete hedge against inflation, since performance benchmark is usually linked or 
determined by inflation rate and assets with positive real return shall be attractive.  
However, previous studies show that when real estate stocks or REITs were applied, 
they showed a negative or insignificant hedge against inflation. (Park, Mullineaux, 
and Chew, 1990, for the United States; and Liu, Hartzell, and Hoesli, 1997, for a 
study encompassing Australia, France, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) This could be due to the fact that real estate stocks 
behave more like stocks in the capital market and which have a negative relationship 
with inflation. (GuÈltekin, 1983) But when both appraisal based and transaction based 
property index are applied, there are a clear positive hedge against inflation. After all, 
the inflation hedging characteristics change under different economic environments. 
 
In China market, more intuition can be given here. The policy related to real estate 
sector will have meet the public’s needs, while inflation being essential concern. In 
case inflation increases and public sector started to worry, central policy may came 
and restrain further development of inflation trend. When policy concerning inflation 
was brought out, it may influence the real estate sector to some extent, since the 
barrier to inflation may also decrease asset value enhancement. This impact on real 
estate may even take effect before the inflation problem was tackled. Thus, when such 
information flows to the market, inflation would digest and react while real estate 
market would also give responses. 
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In China, a common method to adjust and prevent inflation from increasing 
dramatically is change of deposit-reserve ratio. Major commercial banks are state-
owned, and they could adjust inflation effectively. When deposit-reserve ratio is up-
regulated, inflation is expected to slow down in long period, while real estate market 
is likely to be influenced by credit retrench and suffer from performance down-turn 
before inflation slow down. The down-turn process is expected to happen at the same 
time, or quicker in the real estate market since inflation covers multiple industries and 
takes longer period to take effect. Empirical results based on China real estate price 
showed that the increase of deposit-reserve ratio gave direct impact to the property 
price. (Yan & Liu, 2005) 
 
When specific regulations came to real estate market, inflation rate shall also give 
responses, but only in the long term. Example could be the regulations concerning 
credit market in China, mainly Document 121 issued during 2003 macro control wave 
and Document 359 issued in 2007. Both of them aim to control inflation and real 
estate market, and two markets should response with time lag. The real estate market 
was expected to respond immediately, and the inflation rate is also expected to 
decrease, after certain market adjustments. Indeed, the inflation cannot give 
immediate response, since real estate is only part of the calculation basket. 
 
It can be found out that in both cases, credit and monetary market serves as the 
triggering effect between inflation and real estate market. Thus, the development and 
operation of the credit market is crucial in determining the transmission of 
information between the two markets.    
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Based on the above analysis, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Office returns contain information on future inflation 
 
Hypothesis 5: Residential returns contain information on future inflation  
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Part IV. Direct Market and GDP 
When it comes to GDP and real estate, there are two concepts that should be 
explained in advance: Wealth Effect and Income Effect.  
 
The formal version of wealth effect is described as Pigou Effect, first popularized by 
Arthur Cecil Pigou in 1943, in his paper ‘The Classical Stationary State’. In this paper, 
Pigou defines that Pigou effect refers to the stimulation of output and employment 
caused by increasing consumption due to a rise in real balances of wealth, particularly 
during deflation. (Pigou, 1943)  
 
Applied to real estate market, the wealth effect refers to situations when changes in 
housing wealth exert effects upon household behavior. (Case et al, 2005) When 
households’ asset values increase, households can be expected to spend more than 
they otherwise would have, either by withdrawing equity from assets or by saving less 
in other forms. Similarly, when households’ asset values fall, this may lead to a 
contraction in consumer spending. A growing literature documents the effects of 
home price appreciation and depreciation on personal expenditures and savings 
behavior. (Case et al, 2008) The housing wealth effect is expected to be observed 
more clearly in recent decades, since institutional innovations such as second 
mortgages in the form of secured lines of credit have made it as simple to extract cash 
from housing equity as it is to sell shares or to borrow on margin, at least in the US 
market. In another paper comparing wealth effect delivered based on the US market. 
It is found that an additional dollar increase in real estate wealth results to 8 cents 
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increase in consumption compared to only 2 cents in financial wealth increase. (DJ 
Benjamin, 2004) 
 
Income effect within real estate scope is discussed less often. Recent study by Case 
Wellesley College in 2008 could provide some implication on this issue. As the 
decade-long boom in the US housing market unwinds, they anticipated that there will 
be small wealth effects transmitted to the economy, but there will be large income 
effects affecting the rest of the economy and substantial financial market effects. 
When current market home sales decline or housing starts drop, the economy 
experiences a decline in aggregate expenditure and ultimately a reduction in income 
and employment. This occurs through several distinct channels. Fewer sales of 
existing homes means that brokers, building inspectors, appraisers, mortgage lenders, 
home appliance firms, and others in the real estate industry face a decline in demand 
and experience a direct loss of income. While the sale of an existing dwelling unit is 
simply a transfer or an exchange of assets (and thus is not a component of national 
income), the fees and induced expenditures associated with the exchange are high; the 
transfer typically induces spending on furniture, appliances, decorating, and so forth, 
as well as fee income from the services provided by brokers, lenders, appraisers, and 
others. (Case et al, 2008) Especially when housing industry became a great 
component in regional or even national economics, the income effect could be more 
obvious since real estate enterprises could be only of the biggest employers in the 
country. In the entire real estate industry, the income effect could be explained in a 
cyclic effect. Firstly, a contraction in residential or office real estate market causes 
profit reduction for developers and contractors. Then, a decline in sales of units and 
leasing out of office buildings reduces the incomes of brokers, mortgage dealers, 
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bankers, and lawyers involved in the process. Finally, there is a multiplier. (Case et al, 
2008) According to data in US market, a 100 dollar drop in income from a decline in 
residential investment will reduce national income by about 140 dollars. 
 
When GDP is applied instead of consumption, Green (1997) and Coulson and Kim 
(2000) have shown that residential investment is a leading indicator of GDP in the 
United States. Statistically they found that residential investment actually Granger 
causes private consumption, which is the largest component of GDP. But this 
situation may not be true in China, since land development procedure in two countries 
is different. In the States, the land administration operates based on free-hold system, 
and land is owned by different parties. In that case, real estate development is more 
subject to market demand and supply, and government control is limited in effect. On 
the other hand, China runs a lease-hold system, and all land belongs to the central 
government. The sole ownership leads to power of the government to control and 
supply of land, especially in big cities with limited land resources. Developers have to 
bid for land in land sales, apply for planning applications or lease modifications for 
redevelopment, or purchase land with multiple owners. Therefore, there is significant 
time lag between the decision to invest (triggered by an increased demand) and the 
actual realization of the investment. More importantly, the time lag varies 
significantly depending on the scale of development, type of real estate, location, and 
other characteristics. (Chui & Chau, 2005) In that specific paper, empirical results in 
Hong Kong indicate that GDP leads private real estate investments, while investment 
in office sector and industrial sector leads GDP. 
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Part VI. Geographical Comparison 
A test among 4 major cities would be carried out, to compare the speed of digesting 
information from each city and therefore test market efficiency in local real estate 
market. The result is hard to predict, since all 4 markets here have various advantage 
and disadvantages. 
 
Beijing as the capital of China holds a unique political advantage. When foreign 
enterprise decided to enter the China market, they would consider open office in 
Beijing, since it is where central policies were first issued.  As the political and 
cultural centre of China, Beijing is not necessary the economics centre of this 
emerging country. However, each of the 4 cities here serves as regional economics 
centre, including Beijing. The Pearl River Delta region is led by Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou, while the Yangzi River Delta region led by Shanghai. When it comes to 
North China economics, Beijing is definitely the economics centre. While Tianjin is 
planned to be developed as the next economics centre of China by the central 
government, it stills have a long way to go to replace the status of Beijing. The special 
position of capital city provided Beijing unique opportunities including the Asian 
Games in 1990 and Olympics in 2008. Indeed, not a single government would let its 
capital city dropping from regional centre to tier II city in terms of economics 
development. 
 
However, being regional economics centre doesn’t give implications on market 
efficiency. Being the political centre, the appearance of Beijing local economics has 
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political meanings. In order to leave a proper impression to foreign investors and 
other parties, it is necessary to keep the pace of economic development within 
planned pace. Thus, when market is driven out of expectations, interference is applied 
immediately. Within direct control under central government, the market performance 
recorded doesn't indicate free market equilibrium. This, we anticipated that market 
efficiency in Beijing will not be ranked high in the 4 cities listed. 
 
Now turn to Shanghai, the city that is often considered as economics centre of China. 
Being regional centre of Yangzi River Delta and east gate of China, Shanghai has 
geographical advantage as well as historical heritage. During recent decade, Shanghai 
has political advantage thanks to central government planning and foreign investment. 
In 2006, the central government proposed to locate Shanghai as financial and logistics 
centre of China. This proposal was agreed in 2009, a good year for Shanghai. Before 
that, Hong Kong serves as the financial and logistics centre of Southern Asia. The 
focus of Shanghai though, is on Eastern and North Asia. 
 
The objective of being the logistics centre is though and long-term. Experts believed 
that the key is to success for Shanghai to become international shipping centre is to 
raise the volume of international transit boxes. In 2008 the proportion of this part is as 
low as 5% in Shanghai, while 85% in Singapore, 60% in Hong Kong and 45% in 
Busan, Korea. 
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Compared to the difficult situation in logistics, the goal to become the financial centre 
in China is far more realistic for Shanghai. In the end of 2006 a detail proposal was 
brought out, covering the target to set Shanghai as the monetary and capital center of 
China. The focus was on market development and regulation, which is the 
infrastructure for a city to become financial centre. The Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
Shanghai Futures Exchange and Shanghai Gold Exchange covers equity and 
commodities market, and the development of SHIBOR (Shanghai Inter-bank 
Overnight Rate) enhance foreign exchange and bond market. Indeed, these 
achievements provide the city good foundation for market efficiency, especially with 
the support of active participation of capital from various sectors. With proper 
intervention anticipated, we predicted Shanghai to have quite high market efficiency. 
 
Other than Beijing and Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are other two major cities 
in China, both located in Guangdong Province. Guangdong Province is the 
manufacturing centre of Asia and sometimes considered as world factory. Guangdong 
leads the southern part of China in economics development. Being the region with 
most rapid development, Guangdong is however considered to have unbalance 
development. From 1979 to 2009, Guangdong enjoys 13.1% annual increase in GDP, 
ranked number one in China. Economically speaking, Guangdong province is the 
most important province in China, with highest contribution to GDP during past 
decades. Foreign investment in Guangdong turns into 25% of national total, with 
focus on service industry.  
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Within the Guangdong Province, Guangzhou serves as provincial capital. With more 
than 2000 history of foreign trade experience, Guangzhou has historical heritage and 
develops even more rapidly after 1979. Even today, Guangzhou is centre for foreign 
trade in China. The financial and real estate market in Guangzhou is not as developed 
as in Beijing or Shanghai, and more focus is put on economic development in general. 
Thus we anticipated that with focus on foreign trade and substantial economics, GDP 
in Guangzhou reflects information quicker than in real estate industry. 
 
Shenzhen as the youngest among the 4 major cities discussed here is the first city with 
special economic zone in China. Decided by ‘Open Door Policy’, Shenzhen is the 
first city open to foreign investment after 1979. As the experimental field of China 
economics development, Shenzhen runs unique operations in trading, financing, land 
administration, etc. During 1980’s, Shenzhen has become the window and gate of 
China facing the rest of the world. Located next to Hong Kong, Shenzhen has a close 
sample city and easy access to western experience. With the natural advantage of 
open to foreign market and political support on economics development, Shenzhen 
has developed a mature commercial system and established high-speed GDP 
development and industrial achievements. From 1980 to 2004, Shenzhen record an 
annual GDP growth of 28%, leads China and the world. After exceeding other cities 
in Guangdong Province, Shenzhen has been ranked number in China in terms of 
foreign trade for 15 years, and 100 of the Fortune 500 corporations has invested in 
Shenzhen. Indeed, as according to central government proposal, development of 
Shenzhen is backed by foreign investment, while economics administration is mainly 
adjusted by free market. Thus, based on the amount of foreign investment 
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participation and free market adjustment system, we anticipated the market efficiency 
in Shenzhen to be quite high, compared to the other cities. 
 
Based on the above analysis, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Amongst all four most developed office markets, price information 
is first discovered in Shenzhen, which is than transmitted to other cities with the 
Beijing office market at the end of the information transmission chain. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Amongst all four most developed residential markets, price 
information is first discovered in Shenzhen, which is than transmitted to other 
cities with the Beijing residential market at the end of the information 
transmission chain. 
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Chapter Six  Research Design and Methodology 
Research is conducted according to different parts of hypothesis. Empirical test is 
conducted using Granger causality Test. The sequence of tests follows the 5 parts of 
hypothesis. In order to assure consistency of the findings, test will be run under 
various time lag, and compare result under each lag. Probability under 10% is 
considered to be significant. Unit root Test shall be done before the Granger causality 
test to make sure the data applied is stationary. 
 
If test result is inconclusive, the sample will be processed to 1999Q1 to 2009Q1 in 
order to test the recent 10 years development and according results. If result is still 
inconclusive, it would be recorded and discussed after the test. 
 
At the result discussion stage, empirical finds will be discussed based on the history 
of urban development and macro control of real estate industry of different cities at 
different stage. Government documents may be quoted and important incidents will 
be listed and reviewed. Brief history of China property market will be introduced 
before the empirical test since economic development of China is unique in nature 
and further explanation is necessary. Role of each city will be considered to give 
implications to part VI hypothesis. 
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The empirical test mainly consists of unit root test and granger causality test, both 
approaches applied frequently in methodologies regarding to time serious analysis. 
Preliminary data processing is also conducted. 
 
Many observed time series display nonstationary characteristics. (Peter Philips, 1995) 
Some may display a secular way over long term performance, and some may follow a 
random walk in any specific time spot. These patterns are common in regional 
economic performance such as GDP, or capital market performance such as stock 
market performance. The macroeconomics is considered in theory as following 
aggregate consumption behaviour of rational economics agents, and the stock market 
performance is considered to perform under the efficient market hypothesis, and 
follow a random walk. In the research practices, most study upon related data and 
indexes should achieve stationarity before further analysis, and unit root test is 
applied at this stage. 
 
Two common trend removal or de-trending procedures are first differencing and time-
trend regression. First differencing is appropriate for I (1) time series and time-trend 
regression is appropriate for trend stationary I (0) time series. Before the test, non-
index data series is processed into first difference, in order to compose de-trend data 
for granger casualty test purpose. Theoretically, since data has been first differenced, 
then it should be under stationarity. Unit root test is applied to the real estate index, 
both residential and office, as well as the economics and capital market data, to make 
sure the stationarity of data ready for time series analysis. 
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It has been a long history of testing stationarity over economics performance data. 
The first attempt in modern history is done by Nelson and Plosser in 1982 in the 
famous paper ‘Trends and random walks in macroeconomic time series: Some 
evidence and implications; in which they apply ADF test and discovered unit root for 
most economics data series in US. Later on many distinctive approaches other then 
ADF test been applied to the same data series. While it is recognized now that the 
distinctive power of unit root test is often low, there is clear evidence that most 
economic and financial data have a root at or close to unity. (Peter Philips, 1995) 
 
The unit root test applied here in this study is augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root 
Test (ADF unit root test). The notion of this test is widely accepted and explained 
originally in 'Efficient Tests for an Autoregressive Unit Root,' published in 
Econometrica by Elliott Rothenberg & J.H. Stock in 1996. According to Elliott and 
Stock, let cpit = Yt , the Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test are based on the following 
three regression forms: 
 1. without Constant and Trend.          
2. with Constant                               
3. with Constant and Trend               
The hypothesis is: 
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Decision rule:  
If     t* > ADF critical value, then not reject null hypothesis, i.e., unit root exists. 
If     t* < ADF critical value, then reject null hypothesis, i.e., unit root does not exist. 
 
After unit root test, provided that all data are stationary or subject to stationarity after 
adjustment, granger casualty test is applied as described in the research design. The 
notion of casualty is widely used in economic and financial research. However, it is 
relatively an abstract concept and difficult to give a formal notion of it. Wiener tried 
to propose a widely accepted concept of causality based on predictive relation 
between the two time series in question in his 1956 paper. This definition was then 
adopted by Granger from Yale later on and won him the Nobel Prize in Economics. 
According to his famous paper ‘Investigating causal relations by econometric models 
and cross-spectral methods’, time series X is said to Granger-cause Y if it can be 
shown, usually through a series of F-tests on lagged values of X (and with lagged 
values of Y also known), that those X values provide statistically significant 
information about future values of Y.  
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Chapter Seven  Data and Sources 
The data to be used can be divided into 3 parts: real estate market performance, 
capital market performance, and macroeconomics variables. 
 
Slight modification has been made to fit the data into time series model. Based on the 
study and analysis up to now, the following data are collected for this study:  
 
Data / Information Source Remarks 
Quarterly return on Greater 
China Property Index 
(1994Q1-2009Q1), based 
on major 4 cities including: 
Guangzhou; Shenzhen; 
Beijing, and Shanghai 
DTZ Real Estate 
Market 
Return on SSE Real Estate 
Sub- Index 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, PRC 
Capital Market 
Return on Hang Seng Real 
Estate Sub-Index 
Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange 
Capital Market 
China 3-year Government 
Bond interest rate 
Bank of China Capital Market 
54 
 
GDP Growth (Percentage 
change) 
*NBSC Macroeconomics 
Consumer Price Index NBSC Macroeconomics 
Documents, news release and 
announcements by the central 
government 
*MOHURD Macro Control 
 
All above data are placed in Appendix I for reference. 
 
Specifications: 
NBSC stands for National Bureau of Statistics of China 
MOHURD stands for the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
 
Within the direct market price index, there are certain specifications provided by DTZ, 
which should be listed here: 
 
‘Rent and price indices in this publication are compiled using open market values 
prevailing at the time, assuming: 
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1. New lettings in the case of rental values; 
2. Average office and apartment sizes of gross floor areas of 200 and 100 square 
meters respectively; 
3. Mid-floor space in purpose-built buildings of good specifications in central 
business districts or prime residential locations; 
4. Excluding other outgoings e.g. management fees, property taxes and 
maintenance costs; 
5. Excluding rent-free periods, fitting-out costs and other landlord subsidies.’  
 
More explanations of the data are given here. The essential part of data here is real 
estate performance data. Although the local governments and central government of 
China also provide similar data, it is constrained due to length of data coverage and 
accuracy of data. 
 
The first widely used real estate index organized by government authority is China 
Real Estate Index System (CREIS), which is established by Development Research 
Centre of the State Council, China Real Estate Association and China National Real 
Estate Development Group Corporation in the year of 1994 and open to public in 
January 1995. This index is formed based on property price and covers 17 major cities 
in China. It is also the first real estate price index in China. The major source of 
information is market research and sample analysis. This approach can be highly 
subjective since the appointment of sample objective is subject to state council 
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adjustments. The government influence over the index may result into decoration 
upon market facts and twist towards macro control. An example is the controversy 
caused by CERIS in the year of 2009. According to index monthly report at February 
2010, CERIS claimed that property transaction price had risen by 1.5% during the 
year of 2009.  However, this summary has quite a large discrepancy from the 
observation by other organizations as well as the public in general. 
 
The other widely used national index is Real Estate Climate Index, developed by 
National Bureau of Statistics of China in 1997. It is a comprehensive reflection of 
change and development of real estate industry in China, and consists of nine sub-
indexes as well as the combination into one major index presented by percentage 
change. The source of information is research done by National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, and is updated every month. The benchmark result is 100, while above 100 
stands for booming performance and below 100 stands for depression performance. 
 
The methodology of Real Estate Climate Index is according to economics cycle 
theory and Prosperity Index principle and adopting Composite Index approach. The 
elements of calculation include land, capital and market demand. Sub-indexes include 
real estate development investment, source of finance, profit by land transactions, area 
of current development, area of new development, area of completion, vacant area, 
and commercial property sales price. The base value is March 1995 data. 
 
 
57 
 
The calculation of Real Estate Climate Index is completed in eight steps: 
1. Determining index system 
2. Establishing original data base 
3. Eliminating dimension effect 
4. Determining weight number 
5. Determining benchmark comparison period 
6. Eliminating influence by season and price factors 
7. Establishing mathematical model for sub-indexes 
8. Composing index result analysis report 
 
The index result analysis report has been considered as an overview review of the real 
estate industry prosperity in China, and government would design real estate 
adjustment and policy based on the report. Meanwhile investors are also expected to 
adjust investment strategy according to the report. 
 
The third relevant index is National 35 Cities Real Estate Price Index, developed by 
National Development and Reform Commission and National Bureau of Statistics of 
China in the year of 1998. Index result is published on 15
th
 of January, April, July and 
October of each year, stating both quarterly and annual calculation result of last year. 
This index can be divided into 3 categories, including land sales index, property sales 
index and property rental index. The source of information is based on 6 major cities 
in China, and presented as percentage change over last quarter. 
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The last real estate index is DTZ China Index, established by DTZ Greater China in 
1991. As the index with longest history, DTZ Index is published quarterly on 
company research reports and disclosed to public through client delivery. The index 
can be divided into Office and Residential in sectors, price and rental in form of 
income, and covers major cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou. The major advantage of this index is relative independency. As the only 
private index without government intervention with longest time coverage, the DTZ 
index is suitable for independent research in the China Real Estate Market. 
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Chapter Eight Empirical Results 
The Time Series Variables are summarized as following: 
 
Symbol Variable 
BJCPIR Beijing Consumer Price Index First Difference 
BJGDPR Beijing GDP First Difference 
BJOIR Beijing Office Index Return 
BJRIR Beijing Residential Index Return 
BJ_R_C Beijing real estate and capital data group 
BJ_R_E Beijing real estate and economics data group 
 
GZCPIR Guangzhou Consumer Price Index First Difference 
GZGDPR Guangzhou GDP First Difference 
GZOIR Guangzhou Office Index Return 
GZRIR Guangzhou Residential Index Return 
GZ_R_C Guangzhou real estate and capital data group 
GZ_R_E Guangzhou real estate and economics data group 
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SHCPIR Shanghai Consumer Price Index First Difference 
SHGDPR Shanghai GDP First Difference 
SHOIR Shanghai Office Index Return 
SHRIR Shanghai Residential Index Return 
SH_R_C Shanghai real estate and capital data group 
SH_R_E Shanghai real estate and economics data group 
 
SZCPIR Shenzhen Consumer Price Index First Difference 
SZGDPR Shenzhen GDP First Difference 
SZOIR Shenzhen Office Index Return 
SZRIR Shenzhen Residential Index Return 
SZ_R_C Shenzhen real estate and capital data group 
SZ_R_E Shenzhen real estate and economics data group 
 
CITIES_O Cross-region Office Index Return Data Group 
CITIES_R Cross-region Residential Index Return Data Group 
HK_IRE Hong Kong Listed China Real Estate Stock 
HKIRE_R Hong Kong Listed China Real Estate Stock Return 
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SH_IRE Shanghai Stock Index Real Estate Sub-Index 
SHIRE_R Shanghai Stock Index Real Estate Sub-Index Return 
 
The first part of the empirical test is unit root test, to assure observation data is 
suitable for time series test. Since all sectors including real estate (office and 
residential), economics (GDP and CPI) and capital market (SHIRE and HKIRE) has 
been processed as return or first difference, the null hypothesis that the data has unit 
root should obtain a probability of 0 or close to 0. The result of the unit root test is 
summarized according to each city and each factor in Appendix X. 
 
After completing unit root test, it is assured that each factors applied in the Granger-
causality test, after applying first difference and return process, is stationary and 
subject to time series analysis. 
 
The result of Granger-Causality Test is concluded into 5 tables below, in the sequence 
of the 5 parts of hypothesis: 
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Part I. Direct and Indirect Market 
 
From Sector To Sector Time Lag 2 P-Value Time Lag 3 P-Value Time Lag 4 P-Value Confirm hypothesis Inconclusive Reject hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1: Price Information flows from the indirect real estate market (listed property companies) to the office sub-sector 
SHIRE BJOIR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
* 
SHIRE GZOIR < 10% < 5% < 10%  
  SHIRE SHOIR < 5% < 10% < 10%  
  SHIRE SZOIR < 5% < 5% < 10%  
  Hypothesis 2: Price Information flows from the indirect real estate market (listed property companies) to the residential sub-sector 
SHIRE BJRIR < 5% Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SHIRE GZRIR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SHIRE SHRIR < 10% < 5% < 10%  
  SHIRE SZRIR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
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Part II. Office and Residential Sector 
 
From Sector To Sector Time Lag 2 P-Value Time Lag 3 P-Value Time Lag 4 P-Value Confirm hypothesis Inconclusive Reject hypothesis 
Hypothesis 3: Price Information flows from the residential sub-sector to the office sub-sector 
BJRIR BJOIR Insignificant Insignificant < 10% 
  
 
GZRIR GZOIR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SHRIR SHOIR Insignificant Insignificant < 5% 
  
* 
SZRIR SZOIR < 1% < 1% < 1%  
  Additional Test: Price Information flows from the office sub-sector to the residential sub-sector 
BJOIR BJRIR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant   * 
GZOIR GZRIR Insignificant Insignificant < 5%    
SHOIR SHRIR < 10% Insignificant Insignificant    
SZOIR SZRIR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant    
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Part III. Direct Market and Inflation 
 
From Sector To Sector Time Lag 2 P-Value Time Lag 3 P-Value Time Lag 4 P-Value Confirm hypothesis Inconclusive Reject hypothesis 
Hypothesis 4: Office returns contain information on future inflation 
BJOIR BJCPI Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
GZOIR GZCPI Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SHOIR SHCPI Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SZOIR SZCPI Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
Hypothesis 5: Residential returns contain information on future inflation 
BJRIR BJCPI Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
GZRIR GZCPI Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SHRIR SHCPI Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SZRIR SZCPI Insignificant Insignificant < 5% 
  
 
Additional Test: Inflation contains information on future office returns 
BJCPI BJOIR < 5% < 10% < 10% * 
  GZCPI GZOIR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SHCPI SHOIR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SZCPI SZOIR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
Additional Test: Inflation contains information on future residential returns 
BJCPI BJRIR Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
* 
GZCPI GZRIR < 10% Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SHCPI SHRIR < 10% Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
SZCPI SZRIR < 5% < 10% * 10% * 
  
65 
 
Part IV. Direct Market and GDP 
 
From Sector To Sector Time Lag 2 P-Value Time Lag 3 P-Value Time Lag 4 P-Value Confirm hypothesis Inconclusive Reject hypothesis 
Additional Test: Office returns contain information on future GDP Growth 
BJOIR BJGDP < 5% < 5% * 10% * 
  GZOIR GZGDP < 10% < 10% Insignificant 
  
 
SHOIR SHGDP < 5% < 10% Insignificant 
  
 
SZOIR SZGDP Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
  
 
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Part V. Cross-city Direct Market Test 
 
From Sector To Sector Time Lag 2 P-Value Time Lag 3 P-Value Time Lag 4 P-Value Time Lag 5 P-Value Time Lag 6 P-Value 
Hypothesis 6: Amongst all four most developed office markets, price information is first discovered in Shenzhen, which is than 
transmitted to other cities with the Beijing office market at the end of the information transmission chain. 
GZOIR BJOIR Insignificant < 5% < 5% < 10% Insignificant 
SZOIR BJOIR Insignificant < 5% < 5% Insignificant Insignificant 
SZOIR SHOIR Insignificant < 5% < 5% < 1% < 1% 
GZOIR BJOIR Insignificant < 5% < 5% < 10% Insignificant 
Hypothesis 7: Amongst all four most developed residential markets, price information is first discovered in Shenzhen, which is than 
transmitted to other cities with the Beijing residential market at the end of the information transmission chain. 
SZRIR BJRIR < 5% < 5% < 1% < 5% < 5% 
SZRIR GZRIR < 5% < 5% < 10% < 10% < 10% 
SZRIR SHRIR < 10% < 10% < 5% < 5% < 5% 
SHRIR SZRIR < 10% < 10% < 5% < 5% < 5% 
SHRIR BJRIR Insignificant Insignificant < 1% < 1% < 1% 
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Chapter Nine Discussion of Results 
Part I. Direct and Indirect Market 
From the empirical result, we found that except for Beijing, the office sector in major 
cities discovers price from indirect market. The residential market cannot discover 
price from indirect market, except for Shanghai. Previous hypothesis is denied. 
Meanwhile, the indirect market doesn't discover changes from property price, and this 
phenomenon applies to all 4 cities here. 
 
The granger-causality from the indirect market to office sector is consistent with our 
anticipation before the test. Indeed, the common factors influencing these two markets 
take most of the determinants of each market. Both of them are closely related to the 
economics condition, and changes in prices follow closely with the corporate climate. 
The reason why the office market reflects market information later than the indirect 
market is due to transaction and appraisal frequency. Thus after taking lags, the 
correlation is clear. For Guangzhou, the correlation is strongest after two quartets. It is 
even more efficient in Shanghai, since the correlation is strongest after one quarter. 
Shenzhen as we anticipated, have the highest market efficiency in both 2-quarters and 
3-quarters time lag situation. 
 
The exception of Beijing can be explained by its position as political centre. As 
political centre, Beijing is the place where central governance policies are first issued 
and distributed. Thanks to the commercial value of politics information and news and 
strong impact of political control on business world in China, corporate clients would 
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like to receive the information at the first place and adjust their strategy as soon as 
possible. Thus, most of them would be willing to place a branch or at least a 
representative office in Beijing, in order to pay attention to government intention and 
political trend. 
 
Some may argue that with the development of information technology, enterprises do 
not have to be located in Beijing. Since the news would be distributed via various 
channels, all they have to do is to stay in somewhere and wait for the news to come to 
them. This maybe partly true, but in real life, the transmission of information is not as 
transparent as technology described. Back to the ancient time, the politicians and 
businessmen were willing to live in the capital city or city centre, but in that way they 
could get to know information quicker than the others, since they were closer to the 
decision maker, which is the king or emperor. In the modern age, the same approach 
applies. Although information can reach the public once it is released, it is better to 
stay in political centre since some information can be approached before it is 
officially released. 
 
Thus, the demand for office properties in Beijing is highly determined by political 
factors, instead of value of the properties or economics development of the local 
market. Therefore, the impact of indirect market is not as strong as in the other cities. 
When it turns to residential sector discovering price from the indirect market, granger-
causality is found in Shanghai only. It cannot be found in the other 3 cities, including 
Shenzhen being the most efficient market in China. (According to Cross-market 
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Direct Market Test) We would therefore conclude that there is no strong form of price 
discovery in residential sector in China, which is consistent with anticipation before 
the test. 
 
The reason why it happens to Shanghai is mainly because the stock exchange is 
located in Shanghai, and information would influence the local market faster than that 
of other cities. Alternatively, Shanghai is the financial centre of China, and impact 
from the financial sector is relatively stronger than the other sectors. 
 
The reason why residential sector cannot discover price from the indirect market is 
because that the factors determining prices of these two markets differ too much. Not 
like in the office market, participants in the residential market are usually households 
and retail investors. The demand in the market is thus determined by population, 
housing condition, as well as income and wealth. On the other hand, information 
influencing indirect market is more related to capital market. The most essential 
common factor is credit market. When credit contraction happens in the market, both 
real estate market and capital market would reflect poor performance. However, the 
credit market in China is not as developed as in western market such as US and UK. 
Private residential mortgage is not popular in China until late 1990’s. Indeed, the 
welfare housing policy was not abolished until 1998, thus the housing mortgage 
system cannot be developed very well without adequate demand from the market. 
The indirect cannot discover change of value from price of the direct market, as 
anticipated before the test. The indirect market is more efficient, since transaction 
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happens every second while transaction in direct market happens much less frequent. 
Meanwhile, the price of direct properties is also determined by land supply and 
construction cost, while the indirect market is more related to the capital market 
instead of local business policy. 
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Part II. Office and Residential Market 
After testing all 4 cities, it can be clearly concluded that residential sector cannot 
discover price from the office sector. One explanation is that absorption of 
information is happens quicker in residential sector, thus the direction shall be 
reversed. This implication is denied by the following test. The other explanation is 
that different investor groups in the two markets behave differently after receiving the 
same piece of news, and thus changes in the price of residential market don’t follow 
that of the office market. The residential properties investors respond strongly to 
income and wealth as well as market fluctuation and interest rate, while office 
investors respond more to regional economic development and corporate profitability. 
 
When it turns to office sector discovering price from residential sector, granger-
causality cannot be found in 3 of the 4 cities, while clear evidence of price discovery 
can be found in Shenzhen only. Our hypothesis is thus proved in Shenzhen but 
inconclusive in other cities. The residential market has more frequent transactions and 
higher liquidity, so it would be under expectation if clear evidence was found. Now 
price discovery cannot be found, and again, it could be due to different factors 
determining price changes and market value in each market. 
 
The situation in Shenzhen is consistent with the finding that Shenzhen is the most 
efficient market in both office and residential sector. Being the most efficient in both 
sectors with free market adjustment system, Shenzhen has highest probability to 
discover price discovery between two sectors. Meanwhile, capital invested in 
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Shenzhen is mainly from foreign entity, including large amount from Hong Kong. 
Thus, factors determining real estate market is from the same source of capital and 
has common features towards both office and residential markets. 
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Part III. Direct Market and Inflation 
After test upon all 4 major cities, it is found that either office or residential sub-sector 
contains any information on future inflation. On the other hand, information was 
transmitted from inflation to residential sector in Shenzhen, and from inflation to 
office sector in Beijing. This is against our hypothesis.  
 
Inflation is indicated by Consumer Price Index here, and changes in CPI don’t lead 
changes in property sector except for that in Beijing. This should be explained by 
government’s response to inflation. Once government found track of inflation, it 
would runs research and issue policies and intervention to slow down inflation. 
Information related to such policy is usually, issued to public in Beijing. The local 
market participants in Beijing, especially enterprises, have become very sensitive to 
policy change and central government control. Change of policy towards to control of 
inflation often includes credit market contraction and monetary policy, which 
influence the local enterprises’ profitability as well as real estate market. With such 
impact, information related to inflation is very likely to cause changes in office price, 
as indicated by the test result. 
 
When it turns to residential sector, changes in inflation lead to residential price 
changes in Shenzhen. As the most efficient market, the concept of mortgage and 
credit market appears to Shenzhen earlier to other cities. Shenzhen is the first city in 
China to sell land. Being the experiential field in China land administration system, 
Shenzhen is also the first city to run ‘property buys residency right’ system. With the 
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early open to market and rapid development of Shenzhen real estate market, related 
services are expected to be more developed than those of other cities, including 
mortgage and asset based loans. With the relatively mature credit market, income and 
wealth which is related to inflation level could be easily transferred to asset value, and 
here is indicated by real estate price. Inflation results to decrease of purchasing power, 
followed by decrease in real income. According to income effect, lower real income 
would block property price from increasing. Thus if income effect is found in the 
regional economics, inflation would influence property prices negatively. 
 
On the other hand, inflation level cannot discover changes from property prices. The 
determinants CPI consist of following items in 2006 (Zhou, 2007): 
 
Food:        33.20% 
Alcohol and Tobacco:      3.90% 
Clothing:        9.10% 
Electrical Equipment and Maintenance:    6.00% 
Health Care:       10.00% 
Transportation and telecommunication:   10.40% 
Entertainment, education and services:    14.20% 
Housing:       13.2% 
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But it should be noted here that housing doesn't include real estate, which means that 
housing here only includes such particulars like fixings and furniture, but the property 
itself. Thus, changes in real estate cannot directly influence Consumer Price Index. 
That’s why there is no clear evidence of granger-causality from real estate sector to 
inflation level, even if from residential sector. 
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Part IV. Direct Market and GDP 
According to the test result, none of the 4 cities can discover property price from the 
GDP. However, the granger-causality from office sector to GDP is clearly found in 
Beijing and vaguely appears to the other 3 cities. This supports existence of wealth 
effect in China, from the office sector. 
 
From corporate finance perspective, enterprises with higher office property value will 
have higher debt capacity. With higher tangible asset including land and properties, 
the company obtains higher value of collateral and could acquire higher debt for 
expansion increase productivity. Higher office property price indicates higher rent or 
transaction price, supported by positive perspective towards future corporate climate 
and profitability. Better performance of enterprises accordingly, would boom 
economics and further increase GDP growth later, after time lag. Thus, positive 
information towards the economics would provide confidence for enterprises, and 
increase office rental with short period. Later the information or policy would 
transmit into real profitability and productivity and increase GDP growth rate. For the 
same reason if negative information is released, enterprises may move into lower 
grade of office building in order to save rental cost, and then cause office property 
price to decrease. Later the negative policy may take effect and decrease GDP growth 
rate. 
 
Beijing is the city with most obvious track of granger-causality from office sector to 
GDP. The high sensitivity to policy explains the unique position of Beijing. With the 
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issuance of news and policies, enterprises are willing to move into offices in Beijing 
and create a rapid increase in demand. The policy would then brings up local GDP 
growth at the first place, and later spread the effect to rest of the world. 
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Part VI. Geographical Comparison 
In the office sector cross-cities test, we found that Beijing office market discovers 
price form both Guangzhou and Shenzhen markets, and Shanghai office market also 
discovers price from Shenzhen market. This is consistent with our hypothesis. 
 
 
 
The demand for office properties in Beijing and Shanghai is usually considered as 
proxy for foreign companies’ perspective towards China economics development. 
Considered as most essential cities in China, these two cities have become first choice 
for foreign companies or regional business to locate their regional office. Meanwhile, 
the Shenzhen and Guangzhou economics is largely based by foreign capital and 
foreign trade, especially Shenzhen being the ‘Gate of Southern China’ and developed 
largely by foreign capital. Thus according to the test result, information would be 
digested and reflected in Guangdong market first, and then it would be reflected in the 
Beijing and Guangzhou market. Since office market is highly influenced by 
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economics development, we could also infer that the economic development change 
happens to Guangzhou and Shenzhen first, and then influence Shanghai and Beijing.  
 
Turning to the residential market, Beijing market discovers price from both Shenzhen 
and Shanghai market, especially from Shenzhen market with clear track of granger-
causality. Meanwhile, Guangzhou residential market discovers price from Shenzhen 
market. Interestingly, Shenzhen and Shanghai market granger-casual changes in each 
other, forming a feedback effect. This is again, consistent with our hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Shenzhen again, leads the market efficiency in residential sector. All other 3 cities 
discover price from Shenzhen residential market. During 5
th
 national census in 2000, 
82.1% of the population in Shenzhen is immigrants from other cities, while this 
proportion is 20.0% in Beijing, 19.4% in Shanghai and 30.0% in Guangzhou. With 
most of the population as immigrants, the demand for housing in Shenzhen is highly 
related to economic development of the region and is subject to free market.  
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Meanwhile the feedback effect between Shenzhen and Shanghai residential market is 
due to limited land supply in both cities. Different from Beijing and Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen and Shanghai shows very few supply of land in the urban area and 
congested area in the suburban area. The limited supply and constant demand for 
housing makes the market more subject to market demand and supply instead of land 
administration control, thus the market is more efficient compared to the other tow 
cities. 
 
This is an exciting finding to distinguish the market efficiency and to state out that 
Guangdong is the pioneer of China real estate market. Being most important cities in 
China, either Beijing or Shanghai is not the first city to reflect market information. 
Guangdong province, being the key to success in China’s economic development, has 
a clear feature outward-looking economics and leads the office real estate market as 
well. The economics contribution from Guangdong Province to China is export-
oriented, and determined largely by foreign demand and international corporate 
climate. The global market is more efficient than the Chinese local economics since 
it’s mainly determined by free market adjustment, and thus the Guangdong market is 
more efficient than Beijing and Shanghai. The Pearl Delta Region, being the central 
urban region of Guangdong Province, is further dominant by Guangzhou, Shenzhen, 
Fo Shan and Dong Guan. Thus, it is natural to find out the Guangzhou and Shenzhen 
leads the office market in China. 
 
Within Guangzhou and Shenzhen, Shenzhen is even more efficient since it is found 
that Shenzhen office market leads the Shanghai market, which cannot be found by the 
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Guangzhou market. This is consistent with our anticipation that Shenzhen is more 
related to the foreign investment and may have the highest market efficiency among 
the 4 tested cities. Being the biggest special economics region in China, Shenzhen has 
30 years’ history of free market adjustment. With experience from Hong Kong and 
dominant foreign investment, Shenzhen is still the most efficient market in China 
today. 
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Chapter Ten Conclusion 
Summary of Findings 
From the empirical result, we found that except for Beijing, price information flows 
from the indirect real estate market (listed property companies) to the office sub-
sector. Clear evidence of price discovery is also found in Shenzhen, indicating price 
information flows from the indirect real estate market (listed property companies) to 
the residential sub-sector. These findings demonstrated that price discovery process 
happens from indirect market to direct market in China, which provide basic market 
trends for investors and risk supervision approaches for market surveillance. However, 
price information flow from the indirect real estate market (listed property companies) 
to the residential sub-sector cannot be found in other 3 cities. 
 
In Shenzhen, it is also found that price information flows from the residential sub-
sector to the office sub-sector, which provides local investors with indication within 
the direct real estate market helps institutional real estate investors to improve their 
portfolio in specific city. However this price discovery between two sub-sectors in the 
direct real estate market is not found in any of the other 3 cities. Moreover, there is no 
price information flow found from the office sub-sector to the residential sub-sector in 
any of the 4 cities. 
 
Also through this study it is found that information is transmitted from inflation level 
to residential sector in Shenzhen, as well as from inflation level to office sector in 
Beijing. This again, gave investors a good indicator of local real estate market, to 
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better allocate their assets and manage inflation risk with hedging strategy. However 
either office market or residential market contains any information on future inflation. 
Thus, the real estate market cannot work as an indicator for changes on inflation level.  
 
When GDP growth is included in the test, it is found that office returns contain 
information on future GDP growth. Economics development can therefore be 
reflected by the office property market before macroeconomics data is issued. 
However, residential market cannot work as such sort of indicator, and GDP cannot 
give indications on the real estate market on the other hand. 
 
The degree of market efficiency among tested major cites is found in the geographical 
comparison. Amongst all four most developed real estate markets, price information 
is first discovered in Shenzhen, which is than transmitted to other cities with the 
Beijing real estate market at the end of the information transmission chain. This 
finding affirmed Shenzhen’s important position in China’s economic development as 
a window towards foreign investors. Supported by export-oriented economy and 
accumulated by foreign investment, Shenzhen’s real estate market remains as most 
efficient market in China, after 30 years’ history of being Special Economic Region. 
Meanwhile the real estate market of Beijing is proved to be highly sensitive to politics 
and least subject to free market adjustments. Being the capital of China, Beijing has 
lowest real estate market efficiency among major cities in China. 
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Limitation of Study and Further Research 
This study provides implication on the China real estate market. However, it is 
constrained by limited data. The direct real estate index is available only since 1994, 
and includes 4 major cities only. Although it is now extended with more cities 
including Dalian and Tianjin with historical data starting from 1996, the relatively 
small sample observations group weakens the explanatory power of related study. 
Therefore, further study based on alternative real estate index with more observations 
and covers more cities in China could be conducted, provided that the alternative 
index is accurate. In addition, correlation between direct real estate market and other 
capital market segments such as real estate investment trusts and corporate bonds 
issued by real estate companies could be conducted, provided those specific capital 
market is mature. 
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Appendix I Indirect market, direct market and economics data in Beijing 
 
Date Q SH IRE HK IRE Office Index Residential Index GDP CPI 
1994Q1 100.00 100.00 80.75 66.67 3.62586 7.37636 
1994Q2 79.89 87.12 93.66 72.73 3.49797 4.54717 
1994Q3 237.34 102.25 101.73 72.73 3.47778 6.18145 
1994Q4 190.69 80.13 107.65 84.86 3.09840 2.06746 
1995Q1 206.84 76.48 103.97 93.98 3.41578 -3.79448 
1995Q2 195.07 79.97 101.45 96.98 3.06710 -3.64912 
1995Q3 194.54 72.92 105.20 96.98 2.81782 -10.10744 
1995Q4 159.51 73.88 108.37 103.04 2.69929 -7.66876 
1996Q1 152.48 99.71 108.66 109.10 2.61009 -3.95149 
1996Q2 259.57 96.17 109.52 109.10 2.30049 -6.20453 
1996Q3 286.25 115.97 110.03 109.10 1.82274 -5.09890 
1996Q4 302.42 173.47 109.81 109.10 2.26668 -4.53921 
1997Q1 370.89 179.52 108.37 109.10 3.11960 -7.50995 
1997Q2 444.15 282.31 107.94 101.54 2.83375 -6.69658 
1997Q3 329.02 244.30 107.21 100.04 1.91188 -4.94110 
1997Q4 342.18 146.76 106.71 97.76 2.23477 -3.99822 
1998Q1 338.33 144.52 105.48 97.37 2.65425 -2.63310 
1998Q2 364.94 94.81 105.48 94.11 1.91798 -1.34572 
1998Q3 312.51 70.94 99.57 92.15 2.23022 -2.74708 
1998Q4 290.50 91.02 98.06 86.35 2.69754 -4.55622 
1999Q1 275.74 72.85 86.88 86.81 3.14825 -2.37511 
1999Q2 411.48 110.21 84.72 84.53 2.28583 -2.94364 
1999Q3 377.66 88.33 84.72 84.79 3.12205 -1.31533 
1999Q4 362.26 81.29 82.12 84.99 2.34386 -0.66186 
2000Q1 414.66 78.07 86.02 87.40 2.74728 0.16402 
2000Q2 465.72 72.69 85.51 87.40 3.10719 1.64502 
2000Q3 419.55 74.42 85.58 88.05 3.13209 3.40475 
2000Q4 505.51 74.62 88.83 88.24 2.81343 6.32074 
2001Q1 507.97 76.89 93.80 87.33 3.46710 3.45625 
2001Q2 539.99 123.59 94.16 85.77 3.00361 3.27758 
2001Q3 471.80 87.08 96.62 84.86 2.83470 -0.77649 
2001Q4 445.29 109.42 96.62 85.25 2.39459 -7.29245 
2002Q1 436.73 110.20 95.75 85.12 2.65815 -7.41240 
2002Q2 464.84 109.38 94.88 85.05 2.68966 -7.55046 
2002Q3 439.96 88.17 92.43 84.79 3.13790 -4.53760 
2002Q4 360.50 86.58 90.20 90.12 3.01429 -0.26781 
2003Q1 379.29 82.00 88.65 86.80 2.93979 3.33014 
2003Q2 347.65 94.16 87.36 86.19 2.35798 2.69048 
2003Q3 306.70 123.69 87.70 83.65 2.71050 0.77437 
2003Q4 272.73 142.79 86.76 83.92 2.99174 1.47307 
93 
 
2004Q1 363.72 179.82 88.22 84.70 3.17470 -1.10059 
2004Q2 280.51 147.74 87.70 87.41 3.81657 -0.19701 
2004Q3 266.62 167.77 89.77 85.84 3.62596 3.04129 
2004Q4 230.38 204.98 89.77 88.81 3.48277 1.18846 
2005Q1 221.23 242.04 91.10 89.30 3.21314 2.08494 
2005Q2 189.31 224.09 96.90 92.50 2.98213 1.38827 
2005Q3 231.35 368.97 99.70 94.80 2.48538 -1.04715 
2005Q4 242.76 472.41 99.60 97.60 3.11934 -0.46042 
2006Q1 318.62 925.93 100.00 100.00 3.01663 -0.75367 
2006Q2 316.78 773.56 102.70 102.40 3.26815 -0.46029 
2006Q3 436.45 963.49 107.30 109.00 3.06577 -0.72605 
2006Q4 755.69 1628.44 110.30 109.20 3.44945 -0.29737 
2007Q1 1062.65 1587.47 114.50 113.90 3.07218 -0.09906 
2007Q2 1804.91 1934.00 114.50 115.30 3.25996 -0.36276 
2007Q3 2687.55 3274.48 116.80 124.20 3.38219 2.45236 
2007Q4 2352.54 2809.34 116.80 130.20 3.58567 3.98651 
2008Q1 2111.58 2136.21 116.80 133.70 2.51876 4.89890 
2008Q2 1295.34 1726.57 123.50 138.90 2.55630 5.27959 
2008Q3 1107.65 1143.47 125.90 150.20 2.35952 2.46044 
2008Q4 1023.02 1272.40 124.90 146.20 1.56542 -2.38727 
2009Q1 2064.54 1471.29 123.70 131.40 0.94885 -6.26537 
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Appendix II Indirect market, direct market and economics data in Guangzhou 
 
Date Q SH IRE HK IRE Office Index Residential Index GDP CPI 
1994Q1 100.00 100.00 126.0642 115.4134 5.213824 4.523616 
1994Q2 79.89 87.12 127.4426 115.5359 5.029931 -1.318244 
1994Q3 237.34 102.25 128.8211 114.3107 5.000889 -0.345404 
1994Q4 190.69 80.13 146.3648 121.1718 4.455357 -1.656604 
1995Q1 206.84 76.48 168.4197 112.4729 4.440514 -2.809618 
1995Q2 195.07 79.97 166.1641 115.9035 3.987234 -2.969033 
1995Q3 194.54 72.92 162.9060 119.7016 3.663170 -9.336104 
1995Q4 159.51 73.88 162.4048 119.2115 3.509082 -11.53887 
1996Q1 152.48 99.71 152.7557 117.6187 3.277116 -11.26758 
1996Q2 259.57 96.17 144.6104 118.2313 2.888388 -6.132124 
1996Q3 286.25 115.97 145.7382 114.3107 2.288556 -5.052459 
1996Q4 302.42 173.47 136.9664 117.0062 2.845941 -2.661160 
1997Q1 370.89 179.52 150.3748 136.6093 3.459362 -2.651558 
1997Q2 444.15 282.31 156.6404 139.0597 3.142376 -7.142902 
1997Q3 329.02 244.30 156.8910 130.9734 2.120100 -3.847593 
1997Q4 342.18 146.76 154.8860 130.4833 2.478162 -5.596121 
1998Q1 338.33 144.52 144.8610 128.2779 3.017464 -4.741437 
1998Q2 364.94 94.81 143.7332 120.9268 2.180445 -2.295491 
1998Q3 312.51 70.94 133.2070 119.4565 2.535410 -5.120149 
1998Q4 290.50 91.02 126.4401 113.0855 3.066681 -2.764036 
1999Q1 275.74 72.85 119.7986 109.2874 2.917186 -1.586978 
1999Q2 411.48 110.21 117.9189 108.9199 2.118065 -2.076511 
1999Q3 377.66 88.33 117.4176 108.1847 2.892913 1.629333 
1999Q4 362.26 81.29 113.4076 104.2641 2.171837 1.863704 
2000Q1 414.66 78.07 112.6558 104.2641 2.677436 3.515816 
2000Q2 465.72 72.69 108.8964 102.0588 3.028196 4.962853 
2000Q3 419.55 74.42 111.4026 95.3202 3.052465 2.773554 
2000Q4 505.51 74.62 111.7786 95.3202 2.741903 1.827171 
2001Q1 507.97 76.89 114.6608 95.4427 3.111499 -2.097581 
2001Q2 539.99 123.59 111.5280 98.6282 2.695548 -1.915158 
2001Q3 471.80 87.08 112.7811 96.7904 2.543964 -1.726206 
2001Q4 445.29 109.42 112.9064 91.5221 2.148988 -2.636419 
2002Q1 436.73 110.20 112.9064 91.6446 2.866174 -0.136240 
2002Q2 464.84 109.38 113.6583 87.8465 2.900151 -2.293294 
2002Q3 439.96 88.17 108.8964 81.2304 3.383479 -1.279847 
2002Q4 360.50 86.58 102.3649 84.6715 3.250196 0.943319 
2003Q1 379.29 82.00 102.3649 79.3535 3.955348 1.041570 
2003Q2 347.65 94.16 100.1126 81.6475 3.172553 2.891937 
2003Q3 306.70 123.69 95.6081 79.1449 3.646854 2.048088 
2003Q4 272.73 142.79 102.2523 82.3775 4.025246 2.088299 
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2004Q1 363.72 179.82 100.6757 79.6663 3.332314 1.620076 
2004Q2 280.51 147.74 97.0721 83.9416 4.006049 2.552104 
2004Q3 266.62 167.77 94.4820 88.2169 3.805968 3.555911 
2004Q4 230.38 204.98 98.1982 88.2169 3.655670 1.434942 
2005Q1 221.23 242.04 98.5000 91.6000 3.757745 1.167055 
2005Q2 189.31 224.09 95.8000 90.7000 3.487574 -0.550754 
2005Q3 231.35 368.97 97.1000 95.4000 2.906634 -2.271198 
2005Q4 242.76 472.41 95.5000 95.4000 3.648046 -1.170982 
2006Q1 318.62 925.93 100.0000 100.0000 3.440843 -1.595300 
2006Q2 316.78 773.56 102.6000 106.4000 3.727738 -0.522178 
2006Q3 436.45 963.49 108.6000 110.1000 3.496894 0.394668 
2006Q4 755.69 1628.44 108.9000 115.0000 3.934525 -0.098345 
2007Q1 1062.65 1587.47 114.4000 120.6000 3.349369 0.820121 
2007Q2 1804.91 1934.00 114.1000 126.7000 3.554088 0.131995 
2007Q3 2687.55 3274.48 114.6000 158.2000 3.687352 2.514317 
2007Q4 2352.54 2809.34 115.9000 162.1000 3.909191 3.889421 
2008Q1 2111.58 2136.21 105.7000 156.8000 3.554252 5.276132 
2008Q2 1295.34 1726.57 105.7000 151.4000 3.607224 4.961832 
2008Q3 1107.65 1143.47 116.3000 165.1000 3.329542 0.442296 
2008Q4 1023.02 1272.40 113.7000 165.0000 2.208982 -3.275493 
2009Q1 2064.54 1471.29 111.3000 152.8000 0.892481 -9.225283 
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Appendix III Indirect market, direct market and economics data in Shanghai 
 
Date Q SH IRE HK IRE Office Index Residential Index GDP CPI 
1994Q1 100.00 100.00 77.3956 109.7406 3.83759 5.80099 
1994Q2 79.89 87.12 81.2972 115.1566 3.70223 1.77757 
1994Q3 237.34 102.25 89.9763 117.2875 3.68086 3.13613 
1994Q4 190.69 80.13 92.4447 117.2875 3.27932 1.92414 
1995Q1 206.84 76.48 96.9833 126.7877 4.07047 -3.15956 
1995Q2 195.07 79.97 98.6555 124.3904 3.65496 0.24701 
1995Q3 194.54 72.92 99.1332 118.3529 3.35791 -7.43385 
1995Q4 159.51 73.88 95.0723 117.3763 3.21666 -6.63728 
1996Q1 152.48 99.71 93.7187 116.0445 3.79913 -7.17260 
1996Q2 259.57 96.17 93.5595 128.5634 3.34849 -9.62288 
1996Q3 286.25 115.97 94.0372 119.5960 2.65310 -7.65761 
1996Q4 302.42 173.47 92.1262 117.1987 3.29928 -8.73382 
1997Q1 370.89 179.52 93.0021 117.1099 3.95356 -6.79556 
1997Q2 444.15 282.31 93.1613 114.5351 3.59129 -8.41191 
1997Q3 329.02 244.30 90.3745 113.9136 2.42297 -4.26475 
1997Q4 342.18 146.76 88.0653 111.2500 2.83218 -4.60918 
1998Q1 338.33 144.52 86.9506 108.1424 2.87777 0.70086 
1998Q2 364.94 94.81 87.5080 107.1658 2.07950 -0.66509 
1998Q3 312.51 70.94 86.9506 103.7031 2.41803 -6.46135 
1998Q4 290.50 91.02 86.6321 96.2450 2.92471 -5.17483 
1999Q1 275.74 72.85 82.7305 93.5814 3.00383 -7.22869 
1999Q2 411.48 110.21 82.8897 92.6047 2.18098 -1.90122 
1999Q3 377.66 88.33 78.9085 81.4176 2.97884 7.05735 
1999Q4 362.26 81.29 78.9085 76.2679 2.23635 8.12390 
2000Q1 414.66 78.07 81.9342 79.1091 2.56103 8.78349 
2000Q2 465.72 72.69 86.0747 77.5110 2.89654 3.90155 
2000Q3 419.55 74.42 86.9506 76.9782 2.91975 -2.53328 
2000Q4 505.51 74.62 88.6227 79.0203 2.62269 -6.05662 
2001Q1 507.97 76.89 93.9576 80.8849 3.11150 -6.98836 
2001Q2 539.99 123.59 91.6485 83.9036 2.69555 -2.81996 
2001Q3 471.80 87.08 93.0021 84.9691 2.54396 -1.38274 
2001Q4 445.29 109.42 93.7187 84.1700 2.14899 1.49924 
2002Q1 436.73 110.20 91.0911 91.0954 2.61192 2.59192 
2002Q2 464.84 109.38 97.7796 95.1796 2.64288 0.09832 
2002Q3 439.96 88.17 94.5946 89.3196 3.08333 0.90431 
2002Q4 360.50 86.58 103.1122 92.0886 2.96187 -1.66636 
2003Q1 379.29 82.00 102.1294 88.4494 3.28721 -2.62152 
2003Q2 347.65 94.16 97.6249 90.7437 2.63665 -0.09836 
2003Q3 306.70 123.69 94.5946 96.1234 3.03083 -0.92819 
2003Q4 272.73 142.79 92.0557 89.7943 3.34531 2.03089 
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2004Q1 363.72 179.82 84.6847 94.9367 3.19722 2.16208 
2004Q2 280.51 147.74 88.8616 95.0158 3.84364 2.30168 
2004Q3 266.62 167.77 92.3833 94.9367 3.65167 3.08658 
2004Q4 230.38 204.98 90.0901 103.0063 3.50747 0.62396 
2005Q1 221.23 242.04 91.0000 109.0190 3.02253 0.25886 
2005Q2 189.31 224.09 106.3000 99.6835 2.80522 -1.93758 
2005Q3 231.35 368.97 103.2000 99.7000 2.33794 -2.05884 
2005Q4 242.76 472.41 104.8000 98.8000 2.93430 -1.02007 
2006Q1 318.62 925.93 100.0000 100.0000 2.82809 -0.29092 
2006Q2 316.78 773.56 103.1000 103.7000 3.06389 0.79269 
2006Q3 436.45 963.49 108.2000 107.6000 2.87416 0.36339 
2006Q4 755.69 1628.44 117.6000 106.7000 3.23386 0.23134 
2007Q1 1062.65 1587.47 123.7000 109.7000 3.30317 0.29682 
2007Q2 1804.91 1934.00 132.7000 113.2000 3.50507 0.78626 
2007Q3 2687.55 3274.48 136.9000 115.3000 3.63649 2.30662 
2007Q4 2352.54 2809.34 139.6000 146.1000 3.85527 4.07306 
2008Q1 2111.58 2136.21 139.0000 162.7000 2.71467 5.18448 
2008Q2 1295.34 1726.57 143.0000 179.6000 2.75512 4.96453 
2008Q3 1107.65 1143.47 151.0000 176.4000 2.54304 2.00332 
2008Q4 1023.02 1272.40 110.9000 163.7000 1.68718 -1.88987 
2009Q1 2064.54 1471.29 105.7000 156.2000 0.77035 -6.27749 
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Appendix IV Indirect market, direct market and economics data in Shenzhen 
 
Date Q SH IRE HK IRE Office Index Residential Index GDP CPI 
1994Q1 100.00 100.00 117.29 140.08 5.21382 4.52362 
1994Q2 79.89 87.12 123.49 142.76 5.02993 -1.31824 
1994Q3 237.34 102.25 123.79 138.89 5.00089 -0.34540 
1994Q4 190.69 80.13 123.79 147.07 4.45536 -1.65660 
1995Q1 206.84 76.48 123.29 136.66 4.44051 -2.80962 
1995Q2 195.07 79.97 121.69 140.97 3.98723 -2.96903 
1995Q3 194.54 72.92 119.29 145.73 3.66317 -9.33610 
1995Q4 159.51 73.88 118.99 145.14 3.50908 -11.53888 
1996Q1 152.48 99.71 111.99 143.35 3.27712 -11.26758 
1996Q2 259.57 96.17 106.08 144.10 2.88839 -6.13212 
1996Q3 286.25 115.97 106.78 139.34 2.28856 -5.05246 
1996Q4 302.42 173.47 100.48 143.50 2.84594 -2.66116 
1997Q1 370.89 179.52 102.38 138.74 3.45936 -2.65156 
1997Q2 444.15 282.31 104.68 134.28 3.14238 -7.14290 
1997Q3 329.02 244.30 104.78 135.62 2.12010 -3.84759 
1997Q4 342.18 146.76 101.98 135.92 2.47816 -5.59612 
1998Q1 338.33 144.52 99.18 135.17 3.01746 -4.74144 
1998Q2 364.94 94.81 96.27 128.04 2.18044 -2.29549 
1998Q3 312.51 70.94 93.87 118.37 2.53541 -5.12015 
1998Q4 290.50 91.02 88.87 113.46 3.06668 -2.76404 
1999Q1 275.74 72.85 80.06 109.89 2.91719 -1.58698 
1999Q2 411.48 110.21 80.06 107.81 2.11806 -2.07651 
1999Q3 377.66 88.33 78.16 106.62 2.89291 1.62933 
1999Q4 362.26 81.29 72.46 104.54 2.17184 1.86370 
2000Q1 414.66 78.07 75.16 103.20 2.67744 3.51582 
2000Q2 465.72 72.69 87.97 94.73 3.02820 4.96285 
2000Q3 419.55 74.42 87.97 88.03 3.05247 2.77355 
2000Q4 505.51 74.62 86.27 86.40 2.74190 1.82717 
2001Q1 507.97 76.89 89.57 83.28 3.11150 -2.09758 
2001Q2 539.99 123.59 89.17 84.76 2.69555 -1.91516 
2001Q3 471.80 87.08 91.37 80.60 2.54396 -1.72621 
2001Q4 445.29 109.42 91.37 79.41 2.14899 -2.63642 
2002Q1 436.73 110.20 93.47 78.07 2.86617 -0.13624 
2002Q2 464.84 109.38 91.07 77.62 2.90015 -2.29329 
2002Q3 439.96 88.17 86.47 80.60 3.38348 -1.27985 
2002Q4 360.50 86.58 92.63 78.33 3.25020 0.94332 
2003Q1 379.29 82.00 90.38 77.92 3.95535 1.04157 
2003Q2 347.65 94.16 90.60 77.92 3.17255 2.89194 
2003Q3 306.70 123.69 90.60 76.26 3.64685 2.04809 
2003Q4 272.73 142.79 91.20 76.78 4.02525 2.08830 
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2004Q1 363.72 179.82 90.68 77.30 3.33231 1.62008 
2004Q2 280.51 147.74 90.68 74.82 4.00605 2.55210 
2004Q3 266.62 167.77 90.68 77.19 3.80597 3.55591 
2004Q4 230.38 204.98 90.68 77.19 3.65567 1.43494 
2005Q1 221.23 242.04 90.60 80.90 3.75775 1.16705 
2005Q2 189.31 224.09 91.40 83.90 3.48757 -0.55075 
2005Q3 231.35 368.97 92.80 85.30 2.90663 -2.27120 
2005Q4 242.76 472.41 96.70 88.40 3.64805 -1.17098 
2006Q1 318.62 925.93 100.00 100.00 3.44084 -1.59530 
2006Q2 316.78 773.56 105.50 104.30 3.72774 -0.52218 
2006Q3 436.45 963.49 117.50 110.60 3.49689 0.39467 
2006Q4 755.69 1628.44 122.40 117.20 3.93453 -0.09835 
2007Q1 1062.65 1587.47 126.30 126.00 3.34937 0.82012 
2007Q2 1804.91 1934.00 145.10 138.60 3.55409 0.13200 
2007Q3 2687.55 3274.48 173.50 149.10 3.68735 2.51432 
2007Q4 2352.54 2809.34 179.70 144.10 3.90919 3.88942 
2008Q1 2111.58 2136.21 168.60 133.50 3.55425 5.27613 
2008Q2 1295.34 1726.57 164.30 135.50 3.60722 4.96183 
2008Q3 1107.65 1143.47 161.20 125.60 3.32954 0.44230 
2008Q4 1023.02 1272.40 153.50 124.50 2.20898 -3.27549 
2009Q1 2064.54 1471.29 147.40 122.50 0.89248 -9.22528 
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Appendix V Unit Root Test Result 
 
Beijing CPI: 
 
Null Hypothesis: BJCPIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -8.019583  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.544063  
 5% level  -2.910860  
 10% level  -2.593090  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(BJCPIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:41   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q2 2009Q1  
Included observations: 60 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BJCPIR(-1) -1.046404 0.130481 -8.019583 0.0000 
C -0.412038 0.259099 -1.590269 0.1172 
     
     R-squared 0.525810    Mean dependent var -0.064763 
Adjusted R-squared 0.517634    S.D. dependent var 2.849062 
S.E. of regression 1.978747    Akaike info criterion 4.235570 
Sum squared resid 227.0956    Schwarz criterion 4.305382 
Log likelihood -125.0671    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.262877 
F-statistic 64.31371    Durbin-Watson stat 1.919002 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Beijing GDP:  
 
Null Hypothesis: BJGDPR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -8.031860  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(BJGDPR)   
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Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:41   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BJGDPR(-1) -1.126626 0.140270 -8.031860 0.0000 
C -0.023916 0.023825 -1.003799 0.3197 
     
     R-squared 0.530906    Mean dependent var -0.007877 
Adjusted R-squared 0.522676    S.D. dependent var 0.263955 
S.E. of regression 0.182363    Akaike info criterion -0.532322 
Sum squared resid 1.895611    Schwarz criterion -0.461897 
Log likelihood 17.70351    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.504831 
F-statistic 64.51077    Durbin-Watson stat 1.880148 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Beijing Office Index: 
 
Null Hypothesis: BJOIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.085432  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(BJOIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:42   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BJOIR(-1) -0.623353 0.102434 -6.085432 0.0000 
C 0.001931 0.003774 0.511555 0.6109 
     
     R-squared 0.393827    Mean dependent var -0.002677 
Adjusted R-squared 0.383192    S.D. dependent var 0.036162 
S.E. of regression 0.028401    Akaike info criterion -4.251507 
Sum squared resid 0.045976    Schwarz criterion -4.181082 
Log likelihood 127.4195    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.224016 
F-statistic 37.03249    Durbin-Watson stat 2.234895 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Beijing Residential Index: 
 
Null Hypothesis: BJRIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.971153  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(BJRIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:43   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BJRIR(-1) -0.648902 0.130533 -4.971153 0.0000 
C 0.005353 0.005340 1.002343 0.3204 
     
     R-squared 0.302431    Mean dependent var -0.003284 
Adjusted R-squared 0.290193    S.D. dependent var 0.046038 
S.E. of regression 0.038787    Akaike info criterion -3.628172 
Sum squared resid 0.085751    Schwarz criterion -3.557747 
Log likelihood 109.0311    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.600681 
F-statistic 24.71236    Durbin-Watson stat 1.950925 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000006    
     
     
 
 
Guangzhou CPI: 
 
Notes: Due to lack of data in specific cities under province, the CPI of Guangzhou 
applied the CPI of Guangdong Province at general, which is also applied to 
Shenzhen’s CPI. 
 
Null Hypothesis: GZCPIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.087366  0.0331 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.550396  
 5% level  -2.913549  
 10% level  -2.594521  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GZCPIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:44   
Sample (adjusted): 1995Q1 2009Q1  
Included observations: 57 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     GZCPIR(-1) -0.719369 0.233004 -3.087366 0.0032 
D(GZCPIR(-1)) -0.165519 0.225517 -0.733952 0.4663 
D(GZCPIR(-2)) 0.081482 0.188994 0.431136 0.6682 
D(GZCPIR(-3)) 0.267303 0.129421 2.065385 0.0439 
C -0.325151 0.229484 -1.416883 0.1625 
     
     R-squared 0.521529    Mean dependent var -0.041970 
Adjusted R-squared 0.484723    S.D. dependent var 2.313666 
S.E. of regression 1.660813    Akaike info criterion 3.936123 
Sum squared resid 143.4316    Schwarz criterion 4.115338 
Log likelihood -107.1795    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.005772 
F-statistic 14.16987    Durbin-Watson stat 1.737782 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Guangzhou GDP: 
 
Null Hypothesis: GZGDPR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.889052  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GZGDPR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:45   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     GZGDPR(-1) -1.105336 0.160448 -6.889052 0.0000 
C -0.030841 0.026804 -1.150608 0.2547 
     
     R-squared 0.454332    Mean dependent var -0.014752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.444758    S.D. dependent var 0.275252 
S.E. of regression 0.205103    Akaike info criterion -0.297299 
Sum squared resid 2.397832    Schwarz criterion -0.226874 
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Log likelihood 10.77031    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.269808 
F-statistic 47.45904    Durbin-Watson stat 1.659560 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Guangzhou Office Index: 
 
Null Hypothesis: GZOIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.528709  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GZOIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     GZOIR(-1) -0.876388 0.134236 -6.528709 0.0000 
C 0.003989 0.007017 0.568537 0.5719 
     
     R-squared 0.427849    Mean dependent var -0.001320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.417811    S.D. dependent var 0.070160 
S.E. of regression 0.053533    Akaike info criterion -2.983717 
Sum squared resid 0.163351    Schwarz criterion -2.913292 
Log likelihood 90.01966    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.956226 
F-statistic 42.62404    Durbin-Watson stat 1.968512 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Guangzhou Residential Index: 
 
Null Hypothesis: GZRIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.112247  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
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*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GZRIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     GZRIR(-1) -0.792693 0.129689 -6.112247 0.0000 
C -0.001933 0.005929 -0.325976 0.7456 
     
     R-squared 0.395928    Mean dependent var -0.000546 
Adjusted R-squared 0.385330    S.D. dependent var 0.058049 
S.E. of regression 0.045511    Akaike info criterion -3.308417 
Sum squared resid 0.118061    Schwarz criterion -3.237992 
Log likelihood 99.59830    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.280926 
F-statistic 37.35956    Durbin-Watson stat 1.995174 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Shanghai CPI: 
 
Null Hypothesis: SHCPIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.621039  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.544063  
 5% level  -2.910860  
 10% level  -2.593090  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SHCPIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q2 2009Q1  
Included observations: 60 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SHCPIR(-1) -1.234385 0.128301 -9.621039 0.0000 
C -0.427822 0.325364 -1.314904 0.1937 
     
     R-squared 0.614783    Mean dependent var -0.019805 
Adjusted R-squared 0.608141    S.D. dependent var 3.991713 
S.E. of regression 2.498758    Akaike info criterion 4.702230 
Sum squared resid 362.1398    Schwarz criterion 4.772041 
Log likelihood -139.0669    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.729537 
F-statistic 92.56439    Durbin-Watson stat 1.902939 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
     
Null Hypothesis: SHCPIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.621039  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.544063  
 5% level  -2.910860  
 10% level  -2.593090  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SHCPIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q2 2009Q1  
Included observations: 60 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SHCPIR(-1) -1.234385 0.128301 -9.621039 0.0000 
C -0.427822 0.325364 -1.314904 0.1937 
     
     R-squared 0.614783    Mean dependent var -0.019805 
Adjusted R-squared 0.608141    S.D. dependent var 3.991713 
S.E. of regression 2.498758    Akaike info criterion 4.702230 
Sum squared resid 362.1398    Schwarz criterion 4.772041 
Log likelihood -139.0669    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.729537 
F-statistic 92.56439    Durbin-Watson stat 1.902939 
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Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Shanghai GDP: 
 
Null Hypothesis: SHGDPR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.179079  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SHGDPR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:47   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SHGDPR(-1) -1.102057 0.153510 -7.179079 0.0000 
C -0.028029 0.025750 -1.088527 0.2809 
     
     R-squared 0.474844    Mean dependent var -0.012679 
Adjusted R-squared 0.465631    S.D. dependent var 0.269632 
S.E. of regression 0.197103    Akaike info criterion -0.376873 
Sum squared resid 2.214422    Schwarz criterion -0.306448 
Log likelihood 13.11774    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.349381 
F-statistic 51.53917    Durbin-Watson stat 1.725931 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Shanghai Office Index: 
 
Null Hypothesis: SHOIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.022458  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SHOIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:48   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SHOIR(-1) -0.929916 0.132420 -7.022458 0.0000 
C 0.004022 0.007879 0.510436 0.6117 
     
     R-squared 0.463857    Mean dependent var -0.001648 
Adjusted R-squared 0.454451    S.D. dependent var 0.081507 
S.E. of regression 0.060202    Akaike info criterion -2.748917 
Sum squared resid 0.206583    Schwarz criterion -2.678492 
Log likelihood 83.09304    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.721426 
F-statistic 49.31492    Durbin-Watson stat 1.999902 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Shanghai Residential Index: 
 
Null Hypothesis: SHRIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.050194  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SHRIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:48   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SHRIR(-1) -0.784735 0.129704 -6.050194 0.0000 
C 0.003708 0.007469 0.496431 0.6215 
     
     R-squared 0.391057    Mean dependent var -0.001611 
Adjusted R-squared 0.380374    S.D. dependent var 0.072374 
S.E. of regression 0.056970    Akaike info criterion -2.859277 
Sum squared resid 0.184997    Schwarz criterion -2.788852 
Log likelihood 86.34868    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.831786 
F-statistic 36.60484    Durbin-Watson stat 2.017909 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Shenzhen CPI: 
 
The CPI of Shenzhen applied the CPI of Guangdong Province at general, and unit 
root test result subject to Guangzhou CPI test result. 
 
Null Hypothesis: SZCPIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.087366  0.0331 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.550396  
 5% level  -2.913549  
 10% level  -2.594521  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SZCPIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:48   
Sample (adjusted): 1995Q1 2009Q1  
Included observations: 57 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SZCPIR(-1) -0.719369 0.233004 -3.087366 0.0032 
D(SZCPIR(-1)) -0.165519 0.225517 -0.733952 0.4663 
D(SZCPIR(-2)) 0.081482 0.188994 0.431136 0.6682 
D(SZCPIR(-3)) 0.267303 0.129421 2.065385 0.0439 
C -0.325151 0.229484 -1.416883 0.1625 
     
     R-squared 0.521529    Mean dependent var -0.041970 
Adjusted R-squared 0.484723    S.D. dependent var 2.313666 
S.E. of regression 1.660813    Akaike info criterion 3.936123 
Sum squared resid 143.4316    Schwarz criterion 4.115338 
Log likelihood -107.1795    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.005772 
F-statistic 14.16987    Durbin-Watson stat 1.737782 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Shenzhen GDP: 
 
Null Hypothesis: SZGDPR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.889066  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
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     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SZGDPR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:48   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SZGDPR(-1) -1.105338 0.160448 -6.889066 0.0000 
C -0.030841 0.026804 -1.150608 0.2547 
     
     R-squared 0.454333    Mean dependent var -0.014752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.444759    S.D. dependent var 0.275253 
S.E. of regression 0.205103    Akaike info criterion -0.297296 
Sum squared resid 2.397838    Schwarz criterion -0.226871 
Log likelihood 10.77024    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.269805 
F-statistic 47.45923    Durbin-Watson stat 1.659560 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Shenzhen Office Index: 
 
Null Hypothesis: SZOIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.868179  0.0002 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SZOIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SZOIR(-1) -0.586331 0.120442 -4.868179 0.0000 
C 0.001113 0.006187 0.179961 0.8578 
     
     R-squared 0.293673    Mean dependent var -0.001560 
Adjusted R-squared 0.281281    S.D. dependent var 0.055835 
S.E. of regression 0.047336    Akaike info criterion -3.229800 
Sum squared resid 0.127717    Schwarz criterion -3.159375 
Log likelihood 97.27909    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.202309 
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F-statistic 23.69917    Durbin-Watson stat 1.899830 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000009    
     
     
 
 
Shenzhen Residential Index: 
 
Null Hypothesis: SZRIR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.082317  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SZRIR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SZRIR(-1) -0.622545 0.122492 -5.082317 0.0000 
C -0.001840 0.005374 -0.342350 0.7333 
     
     R-squared 0.311843    Mean dependent var -0.000596 
Adjusted R-squared 0.299770    S.D. dependent var 0.049279 
S.E. of regression 0.041236    Akaike info criterion -3.505691 
Sum squared resid 0.096924    Schwarz criterion -3.435266 
Log likelihood 105.4179    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.478200 
F-statistic 25.82995    Durbin-Watson stat 2.209928 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004    
     
     
 
 
Shanghai Stock Index Real Estate Sub-Index Return: 
 
Null Hypothesis: SHIRE_R has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.104283  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SHIRE_R)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:50   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SHIRE_R(-1) -0.985268 0.138687 -7.104283 0.0000 
C 0.054538 0.035050 1.556006 0.1252 
     
     R-squared 0.469624    Mean dependent var 0.015706 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460319    S.D. dependent var 0.361994 
S.E. of regression 0.265931    Akaike info criterion 0.222153 
Sum squared resid 4.031010    Schwarz criterion 0.292578 
Log likelihood -4.553520    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.249644 
F-statistic 50.47084    Durbin-Watson stat 1.488436 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Hong Kong Listed China Real Estate Stocks Return: 
 
Null Hypothesis: HKIRE_R has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.586661  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.546099  
 5% level  -2.911730  
 10% level  -2.593551  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(HKIRE_R)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/05/10   Time: 17:50   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2009Q1  
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     HKIRE_R(-1) -1.001818 0.132050 -7.586661 0.0000 
C 0.047987 0.034415 1.394371 0.1686 
     
     R-squared 0.502433    Mean dependent var 0.004799 
Adjusted R-squared 0.493704    S.D. dependent var 0.366391 
S.E. of regression 0.260703    Akaike info criterion 0.182444 
Sum squared resid 3.874078    Schwarz criterion 0.252869 
Log likelihood -3.382100    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.209935 
F-statistic 57.55742    Durbin-Watson stat 1.982920 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix VI Granger Causality Test Result 
 
Beijing Direct and Indirect Market 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:43 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  58  6.95314 0.0021 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  1.13704 0.3285 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJRIR  58  3.56693 0.0352 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.65471 0.5237 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJRIR  58  0.93031 0.4008 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.25663 0.7746 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJOIR  58  0.80639 0.4519 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.81211 0.4494 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJOIR  58  0.68290 0.5095 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.06571 0.3517 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  58  0.49735 0.6110 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.05690 0.9447 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:43 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 3   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  57  2.46509 0.0730 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  1.83560 0.1527 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJRIR  57  1.76619 0.1656 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.91497 0.4405 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJRIR  57  1.60567 0.1998 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.30144 0.8242 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJOIR  57  0.38378 0.7651 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  1.85919 0.1485 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJOIR  57  3.44984 0.0233 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.59395 0.2025 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  57  0.16131 0.9219 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.14931 0.3384 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
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Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:43 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  56  1.52671 0.2098 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  2.11956 0.0932 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJRIR  56  1.00445 0.4148 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.97570 0.4298 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJRIR  56  4.41031 0.0041 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.57475 0.6823 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJOIR  56  0.90533 0.4686 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  2.19031 0.0845 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause BJOIR  56  2.26964 0.0757 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.51873 0.2120 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  56  0.11265 0.9775 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.75580 0.5593 
    
    
 
 
Beijing Direct Market and Economics 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:45 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  58  6.95314 0.0021 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  1.13704 0.3285 
    
     BJGDPR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  58  0.24995 0.7798 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJGDPR  3.19353 0.0490 
    
     BJCPIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  58  2.92928 0.0621 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJCPIR  0.55234 0.5789 
    
     BJGDPR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  58  1.41757 0.2513 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJGDPR  1.54985 0.2217 
    
     BJCPIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  58  3.05537 0.0555 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJCPIR  2.38555 0.1019 
    
     BJCPIR does not Granger Cause BJGDPR  58  0.69144 0.5053 
 BJGDPR does not Granger Cause BJCPIR  0.88013 0.4207 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:45 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 3   
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 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  57  2.46509 0.0730 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  1.83560 0.1527 
    
     BJGDPR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  57  0.50627 0.6797 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJGDPR  2.74339 0.0528 
    
     BJCPIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  57  0.79355 0.5033 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJCPIR  0.38625 0.7634 
    
     BJGDPR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  57  1.32315 0.2773 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJGDPR  1.33885 0.2723 
    
     BJCPIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  57  1.76248 0.1663 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJCPIR  1.22243 0.3113 
    
     BJCPIR does not Granger Cause BJGDPR  57  1.21838 0.3127 
 BJGDPR does not Granger Cause BJCPIR  1.05132 0.3782 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:45 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  56  1.52671 0.2098 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  2.11956 0.0932 
    
     BJGDPR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  56  1.02292 0.4053 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJGDPR  1.99716 0.1103 
    
     BJCPIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  56  2.31517 0.0711 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause BJCPIR  0.06709 0.9915 
    
     BJGDPR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  56  1.45902 0.2297 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJGDPR  1.44417 0.2343 
    
     BJCPIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  56  2.98054 0.0284 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause BJCPIR  0.22227 0.9247 
    
     BJCPIR does not Granger Cause BJGDPR  56  1.91979 0.1227 
 BJGDPR does not Granger Cause BJCPIR  1.10270 0.3664 
    
    
 
 
Guangzhou Direct and Indirect Market 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:45 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  58  1.39883 0.2559 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  0.26205 0.7705 
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     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZRIR  58  2.06960 0.1363 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.24784 0.7814 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZRIR  58  1.77138 0.1800 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.51823 0.5986 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZOIR  58  2.41608 0.0990 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.18911 0.8283 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZOIR  58  2.73787 0.0739 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.70231 0.5000 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  58  0.49735 0.6110 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.05690 0.9447 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:47 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 3   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  57  1.12486 0.3479 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  0.10391 0.9574 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZRIR  57  0.90885 0.4435 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.38256 0.7660 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZRIR  57  1.40167 0.2532 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.87627 0.4597 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZOIR  57  3.16582 0.0324 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.04726 0.9862 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZOIR  57  2.32939 0.0856 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  2.09330 0.1129 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  57  0.16131 0.9219 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.14931 0.3384 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:47 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  56  3.19273 0.0212 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  0.30257 0.8748 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZRIR  56  0.62502 0.6470 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.70317 0.5937 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZRIR  56  3.24127 0.0198 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.54250 0.7053 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZOIR  56  2.42236 0.0613 
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 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.04055 0.9968 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause GZOIR  56  2.66513 0.0438 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.54571 0.2045 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  56  0.11265 0.9775 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.75580 0.5593 
    
    
 
 
Guangzhou Direct Market and Economics 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:48 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  58  1.39883 0.2559 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  0.26205 0.7705 
    
     GZGDPR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  58  0.37382 0.6899 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZGDPR  1.71896 0.1891 
    
     GZCPIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  58  2.75594 0.0727 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZCPIR  1.25368 0.2938 
    
     GZGDPR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  58  1.77668 0.1791 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZGDPR  3.10747 0.0530 
    
     GZCPIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  58  0.08278 0.9207 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZCPIR  0.03260 0.9679 
    
     GZCPIR does not Granger Cause GZGDPR  58  2.46202 0.0950 
 GZGDPR does not Granger Cause GZCPIR  0.22201 0.8017 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:48 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 3   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  57  1.12486 0.3479 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  0.10391 0.9574 
    
     GZGDPR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  57  0.28165 0.8384 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZGDPR  1.22787 0.3094 
    
     GZCPIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  57  1.49970 0.2260 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZCPIR  1.45353 0.2385 
    
     GZGDPR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  57  1.43061 0.2449 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZGDPR  2.62887 0.0603 
    
     GZCPIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  57  0.31727 0.8128 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZCPIR  0.02661 0.9941 
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     GZCPIR does not Granger Cause GZGDPR  57  1.75032 0.1687 
 GZGDPR does not Granger Cause GZCPIR  0.32444 0.8077 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:48 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  56  3.19273 0.0212 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  0.30257 0.8748 
    
     GZGDPR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  56  0.45477 0.7684 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZGDPR  1.01806 0.4078 
    
     GZCPIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  56  1.77577 0.1496 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause GZCPIR  0.28034 0.8892 
    
     GZGDPR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  56  1.11031 0.3629 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZGDPR  1.67020 0.1727 
    
     GZCPIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  56  0.15608 0.9593 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause GZCPIR  0.66962 0.6163 
    
     GZCPIR does not Granger Cause GZGDPR  56  1.74183 0.1567 
 GZGDPR does not Granger Cause GZCPIR  1.54990 0.2033 
    
    
 
 
Shanghai Direct and Indirect Market 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:48 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  58  2.92071 0.0626 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  2.72559 0.0747 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHRIR  58  2.81935 0.0686 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  3.34290 0.0429 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHRIR  58  2.01749 0.1431 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.54062 0.2237 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHOIR  58  3.74363 0.0301 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  1.15175 0.3239 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHOIR  58  1.43278 0.2477 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.23917 0.7881 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  58  0.49735 0.6110 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.05690 0.9447 
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Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:48 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 3   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  57  1.83359 0.1531 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  1.89155 0.1430 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHRIR  57  2.97110 0.0405 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  1.77856 0.1632 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHRIR  57  1.56704 0.2090 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.60470 0.2000 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHOIR  57  2.75183 0.0523 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.50237 0.6824 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHOIR  57  1.49719 0.2267 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.43706 0.7274 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  57  0.16131 0.9219 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.14931 0.3384 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:49 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  56  1.37279 0.2577 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  4.09405 0.0063 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHRIR  56  2.44587 0.0593 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  2.23719 0.0792 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHRIR  56  2.09058 0.0970 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  2.74393 0.0393 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHOIR  56  2.10547 0.0950 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.47170 0.7562 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHOIR  56  2.19032 0.0845 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.88750 0.4788 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  56  0.11265 0.9775 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.75580 0.5593 
    
    
 
 
Shanghai Direct Market and Economics 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:49 
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Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  58  2.92071 0.0626 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  2.72559 0.0747 
    
     SHGDPR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  58  1.49680 0.2332 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHGDPR  0.97319 0.3845 
    
     SHCPIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  58  2.61813 0.0824 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHCPIR  0.19555 0.8230 
    
     SHGDPR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  58  0.19482 0.8236 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHGDPR  3.70806 0.0311 
    
     SHCPIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  58  0.90920 0.4090 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHCPIR  0.52068 0.5971 
    
     SHCPIR does not Granger Cause SHGDPR  58  0.60365 0.5505 
 SHGDPR does not Granger Cause SHCPIR  0.08854 0.9154 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:49 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 3   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  57  1.83359 0.1531 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  1.89155 0.1430 
    
     SHGDPR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  57  1.46383 0.2356 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHGDPR  1.25360 0.3004 
    
     SHCPIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  57  2.14232 0.1066 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHCPIR  0.21443 0.8859 
    
     SHGDPR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  57  1.84778 0.1505 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHGDPR  2.69563 0.0558 
    
     SHCPIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  57  0.60951 0.6120 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHCPIR  0.66620 0.5768 
    
     SHCPIR does not Granger Cause SHGDPR  57  0.49565 0.6869 
 SHGDPR does not Granger Cause SHCPIR  2.86522 0.0458 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:49 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  56  1.37279 0.2577 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  4.09405 0.0063 
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 SHGDPR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  56  0.91650 0.4623 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHGDPR  1.59342 0.1917 
    
     SHCPIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  56  1.59321 0.1917 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SHCPIR  0.32149 0.8622 
    
     SHGDPR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  56  1.55713 0.2013 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHGDPR  1.22848 0.3116 
    
     SHCPIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  56  0.47196 0.7560 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SHCPIR  0.50239 0.7341 
    
     SHCPIR does not Granger Cause SHGDPR  56  0.05442 0.9943 
 SHGDPR does not Granger Cause SHCPIR  2.99698 0.0277 
    
    
 
 
Shenzhen Direct and Indirect Market 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:50 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  58  0.29502 0.7457 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  9.40180 0.0003 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZRIR  58  1.57725 0.2161 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  2.00566 0.1447 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZRIR  58  1.42373 0.2499 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.26185 0.2915 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZOIR  58  3.29640 0.0447 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.07813 0.9250 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZOIR  58  1.95308 0.1519 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  3.24983 0.0466 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  58  0.49735 0.6110 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.05690 0.9447 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:50 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 3   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  57  0.12792 0.9431 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  5.32785 0.0029 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZRIR  57  0.56138 0.6430 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  1.07869 0.3666 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZRIR  57  1.86393 0.1477 
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 SZRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.67751 0.5699 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZOIR  57  3.50419 0.0219 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.02051 0.9960 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZOIR  57  2.04470 0.1195 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.92409 0.1377 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  57  0.16131 0.9219 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.14931 0.3384 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:50 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  56  0.22952 0.9205 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  4.31849 0.0047 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZRIR  56  0.29581 0.8792 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.90721 0.4675 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZRIR  56  1.11454 0.3609 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.77468 0.5472 
    
     SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZOIR  56  2.37880 0.0651 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  0.51779 0.7230 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SZOIR  56  1.65836 0.1755 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  1.57691 0.1960 
    
     HKIRE_R does not Granger Cause SHIRE_R  56  0.11265 0.9775 
 SHIRE_R does not Granger Cause HKIRE_R  0.75580 0.5593 
    
    
 
 
Shenzhen Direct Market and Economics 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:50 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  58  0.29502 0.7457 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  9.40180 0.0003 
    
     SZGDPR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  58  0.32608 0.7232 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZGDPR  0.53243 0.5903 
    
     SZCPIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  58  3.69196 0.0315 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZCPIR  1.06036 0.3536 
    
     SZGDPR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  58  0.02139 0.9788 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZGDPR  1.57002 0.2176 
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     SZCPIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  58  1.11761 0.3346 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZCPIR  1.52790 0.2264 
    
     SZCPIR does not Granger Cause SZGDPR  58  2.46202 0.0950 
 SZGDPR does not Granger Cause SZCPIR  0.22201 0.8016 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:50 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 3   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  57  0.12792 0.9431 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  5.32785 0.0029 
    
     SZGDPR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  57  0.21943 0.8825 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZGDPR  0.36604 0.7778 
    
     SZCPIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  57  3.39063 0.0250 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZCPIR  0.87235 0.4617 
    
     SZGDPR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  57  1.67470 0.1843 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZGDPR  1.68108 0.1830 
    
     SZCPIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  57  1.10165 0.3572 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZCPIR  0.87781 0.4589 
    
     SZCPIR does not Granger Cause SZGDPR  57  1.75031 0.1687 
 SZGDPR does not Granger Cause SZCPIR  0.32445 0.8077 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:50 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  56  0.22952 0.9205 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  4.31849 0.0047 
    
     SZGDPR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  56  0.56719 0.6877 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZGDPR  0.53042 0.7139 
    
     SZCPIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  56  1.75816 0.1532 
 SZRIR does not Granger Cause SZCPIR  2.88140 0.0325 
    
     SZGDPR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  56  2.74660 0.0391 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZGDPR  0.86792 0.4902 
    
     SZCPIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  56  0.91341 0.4640 
 SZOIR does not Granger Cause SZCPIR  1.28763 0.2884 
    
     SZCPIR does not Granger Cause SZGDPR  56  1.74182 0.1567 
 SZGDPR does not Granger Cause SZCPIR  1.54988 0.2033 
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Geographical Test on Office Sector 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:55 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  58  0.67314 0.5144 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  1.01530 0.3692 
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  58  0.85796 0.4298 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  0.29025 0.7493 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  58  0.90550 0.4105 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  0.51126 0.6027 
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  58  1.86960 0.1642 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  0.10711 0.8986 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  58  0.73117 0.4861 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  0.23228 0.7935 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  58  0.64478 0.5288 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  1.44315 0.2453 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:55 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 3   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  57  3.93288 0.0135 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  0.33025 0.8035 
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  57  0.76470 0.5192 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  0.56475 0.6408 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  57  3.18292 0.0317 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  0.15645 0.9250 
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  57  0.93756 0.4296 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  1.33613 0.2732 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  57  0.38136 0.7669 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  0.05141 0.9844 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  57  3.60143 0.0196 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  1.28722 0.2890 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:55 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 4   
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     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  56  2.69538 0.0420 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  0.63425 0.6406 
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  56  0.95658 0.4401 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  0.36709 0.8308 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  56  2.40058 0.0632 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  0.38454 0.8186 
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  56  0.99802 0.4181 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  1.20544 0.3211 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  56  0.87745 0.4846 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  0.05909 0.9933 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  56  2.75557 0.0387 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  1.48791 0.2210 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:55 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 5   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  55  2.04588 0.0907 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  0.52767 0.7540 
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  55  0.87924 0.5029 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  0.32072 0.8979 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  55  1.74521 0.1443 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  0.84848 0.5230 
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  55  0.79246 0.5609 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  3.95718 0.0047 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  55  0.63214 0.6762 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  0.13421 0.9836 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  55  3.61817 0.0079 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  1.29740 0.2824 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:56 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 6   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  54  1.58955 0.1747 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  0.40471 0.8716 
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  54  1.02929 0.4203 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  0.30208 0.9322 
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     SZOIR does not Granger Cause BJOIR  54  2.00110 0.0876 
 BJOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  0.80069 0.5751 
    
     SHOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  54  0.83480 0.5502 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  3.11578 0.0131 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause GZOIR  54  0.61762 0.7149 
 GZOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  0.14731 0.9886 
    
     SZOIR does not Granger Cause SHOIR  54  3.78263 0.0043 
 SHOIR does not Granger Cause SZOIR  1.21773 0.3170 
    
    
 
 
Geographical Test on Residential Sector 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:56 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  58  0.33179 0.7191 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  0.74424 0.4800 
    
     SHRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  58  0.59944 0.5528 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  2.37577 0.1028 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  58  4.12657 0.0216 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  2.31785 0.1084 
    
     SHRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  58  0.25873 0.7730 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  0.07635 0.9266 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  58  2.87391 0.0653 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  2.42896 0.0979 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  58  2.71527 0.0754 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  2.97565 0.0596 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:56 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 3   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  57  0.44837 0.7195 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  1.00308 0.3992 
    
     SHRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  57  0.91743 0.4393 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  1.58169 0.2055 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  57  4.17606 0.0103 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  1.16197 0.3336 
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 SHRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  57  1.12542 0.3477 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  0.17215 0.9147 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  57  2.90551 0.0437 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  1.31138 0.2811 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  57  2.52167 0.0684 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  2.65447 0.0585 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:56 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  56  1.83181 0.1385 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  0.85180 0.4998 
    
     SHRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  56  4.20398 0.0054 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  1.31898 0.2767 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  56  4.10773 0.0062 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  0.47954 0.7506 
    
     SHRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  56  1.10644 0.3647 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  0.53246 0.7125 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  56  2.52023 0.0535 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  1.59678 0.1908 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  56  2.80561 0.0361 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  3.39211 0.0162 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:56 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 5   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  55  1.30697 0.2785 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  1.15506 0.3463 
    
     SHRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  55  3.90347 0.0051 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  1.47748 0.2165 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  55  2.65156 0.0352 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  0.42625 0.8279 
    
     SHRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  55  0.93319 0.4689 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  1.34889 0.2620 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  55  2.11111 0.0819 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  0.88713 0.4979 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  55  2.43852 0.0491 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  3.17611 0.0156 
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Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/06/10   Time: 21:56 
Sample: 1994Q1 2009Q1  
Lags: 6   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     GZRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  54  1.03123 0.4191 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  1.37246 0.2486 
    
     SHRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  54  3.96612 0.0032 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  1.48307 0.2080 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause BJRIR  54  2.77046 0.0236 
 BJRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  0.54181 0.7733 
    
     SHRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  54  0.80534 0.5716 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  1.30317 0.2775 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause GZRIR  54  1.98736 0.0897 
 GZRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  0.76795 0.5994 
    
     SZRIR does not Granger Cause SHRIR  54  1.84605 0.1139 
 SHRIR does not Granger Cause SZRIR  2.47700 0.0389 
    
    
 
 
